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

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
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SOCIAL PROGRESS.

AN ESSAY

BY

DANIEL GREENLEAF THOMPSON
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AUTHOR OF 'A SYSTEM OF PSYCHOLOGY' 'THE PROBLEM OF EVIL'

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
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PREFACE.

THE 'System of Psychology,' by the present writer, was published in 1884 ; 'The Problem of Evil,' in 1886 ; the 'Religious Sentiments of the Human Mind,' in 1888. None of these volumes has a preface, the author believing that in general, when a book is before the reader, to explain it is quite superfluous. It ought to be judged according to what it is, not according to what its author may say about it. With this treatise I depart from my former practice, not so much for the purpose of commenting upon what is now presented to the public, as with the view of showing its relations to former works and its place in a scheme of systematic thought which was projected more than twenty years ago and has been completed to this point. I shall, therefore, ask the reader's pardon for becoming a little autobiographical and for indulging in a somewhat familiar conversation about my books and the philosophy of which they are the expression.

In looking over a note-book, dated nineteen years ago, in the year of my graduation from Amherst College, in Massachusetts, I find a general plan of life, which had been fixed upon two or three years previously. As we grow older we are rather inclined to disparage our youthful enthusiasms. They are apt

to seem ridiculous to us and to others. But to an observer of the development of the individual human mind, it is interesting to look back and compare past with present positions. Nor is it without interest to students generally, perhaps, to note that it is possible for a man, who during all the period has been also devoted to the study and practice of an exacting profession, to carry out for twenty years a systematic plan of philosophical study, writing and publication. Thus I may be excused for referring to my old notebook and saying that I find therein set forth as the chief object of my life to take precedence of all others, 'the attempt to attain, expound, and apply some of the principles which underlie all knowledge.'

Some four or five years prior to the date of this memorandum (1869), at about the age of fifteen, I read and was deeply interested in Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason.' This was the first book of a philosophical character that I had studied, and it made a profound impression upon me. I endeavoured to master it, and for two or three years it completely possessed my thought. My college course required for a year the study of the works of Dr. Laurens P. Hickok, which are a development from Kantian philosophy, though by no means resting with Kant's conclusions. In addition, Schweigler's 'History of Philosophy' constituted a part of the plan of study. My whole mental development was along the lines of German philosophy. After forming the idea of a more thorough work, my first anxiety was to familiarise myself with what might be considered the other side from that with which I had previously been acquainted. Accordingly I read Hume, then Locke, then James Mill's 'Analysis,' and afterward Hartley,

Thomas Brown, Stuart Mill's 'Logic,' Bain's works, and finally Herbert Spencer. The result was an entire mental revolution culminating in a profound conviction that while German philosophy of the Kantian type was useful as a corrective, the most valuable work in psychology and philosophy belonged to England. This I do not doubt to-day, though German psychological study in special directions has been very fruitful and is worthy of high credit. Psychology is certainly entitled to be called a science, although there may be some who still dispute its claims. The unscientific character ascribed to it, however, has been largely owing to the failure of its devotees to cast off metaphysical and speculative connections both in the method of study and in the exhibition of results. It has progressed to a scientific standing by the adoption of the method of all science, namely, the observation of facts and generalisation, wholly irrespective of any metaphysical or transcendental implications. Such implications cannot be excluded from psychological science, but whatever philosophical doctrines are adumbrated or even expressed should follow and not lead the course of psychological thought.

I thus came to believe that psychology has been raised to the rank of a science chiefly by the labours of what has been called the English Experiential School. Though Locke contributed much of psychological value, psychology as a distinct science begins to emerge in the works of James Mill. This writer undoubtedly struck upon the scientific method of psychological study. He also expressed the central doctrine of psychology, namely, the laws of association, though he did not see their full import, nor understand all their relations. John Stuart Mill likewise

made many valuable suggestions in psychology, tending to establish more firmly still its scientific character. Professor Bain accomplished an absolutely essential work in presenting a cyclopedia of classified facts in regard to mental life, which must, I think, always be resorted to by students who desire to pursue their studies with a knowledge of mental phenomena scientifically arranged without metaphysical colouring. The unification of psychological facts under the general law of evolution by Herbert Spencer still further advanced the progress of the science. In addition, a large number of able workers had month by month, and year by year, been building up the fabric of psychological science, until there no longer existed ground for the old reproaches.

From this point of view the author believed that the time had come for a review and revision of that system of psychology which the English Experiential School had thus constructed. It seemed to him also that a further systematisation was needed; that the things settled ought to be emphasised as settled, the things unsettled ought to be indicated, that the general method ought to be made more plain, that some omissions ought to be supplied, that a more complete synthesis should be attempted both of facts and principles. More particularly it seemed to him that the view of mind as an active power, rather than as a passivity, which constitutes one of the most valuable elements of German thought and which had been neglected somewhat by the English school referred to, was quite compatible with the principles and methods of the latter and was needed to complete the English system. Therefore the author commenced such a work of revision, systematising, co-ordinating,

and supplementing, which after ten years of labour issued in his 'System of Psychology.'

I suppose this book has, to the well-equipped scholar, the appearance of an old garment with its cut altered here and there, and new cloth now and again sewed in. But it should be considered that the whole has been carefully scrutinised, the fabric tested, the seams and rents closed up in one place and another and the cloth cleaned and furbished. The reader no doubt finds some things new, and some old topics treated in a novel manner; and if critics are inclined to complain that they have to go over much with which they are acquainted in order to reach the new ideas, I claim at their hands at least the credit of having examined, and thoroughly deliberated upon every topic and question in the range of the work. If then anything appears as old matter, it represents the author's conviction, after close scrutiny, in the light, too, of authorities Continental as well as English, that it ought to stand as verified science. I am sure in scientific study it is a merit to know when not to be original. If, therefore, in the 'System of Psychology' I have succeeded in repressing within proper limits the natural inclination to innovation and radicalism, and if the statements made above be accepted, I shall certainly esteem it as much a compliment to my work as any credit I may obtain for novelties.

The original features of the 'Psychology' are either absolutely so, or relatively, by laying a new stress on some principles previously enunciated but neglected. They have been in the main recognised by those who have favoured the work with their attention, but not altogether. I will venture to instance a few particu-

lars in which I have been disposed to believe that an advance has been made in this book upon previous psychological science: (1) In the method of treatment by which the law of evolution is applied to the systematisation of mental facts in a more complete manner than by former psychologists; (2) In the unification of the postulated truths of psychology with those of all science (chaps. iii., xi.); (3) In the analysis of the Elements of Consciousness (chap. ix.); (4) In the doctrine that space and force are complementary sides of matter (chaps. xii., xviii.); (5) The doctrine that the law of correlation of forces is a law of coexistence (chap. xvii.); (6) The correspondence between the elements of consciousness and those of 'external' things (chaps. ix., xiii.); (7) The systematising of organic functions into introsusception, repulsion, assimilation, disassimilation, expulsion, and reproduction, and the exposition of the general facts of organic nature upon this system (chap. xix., ff.); (8) The increased emphasis laid upon the idea that cognition is specialised definite feeling (chap. xxvii.); (9) The contention that the stimulus to action is pain not pleasure (chap. xxviii.); (10) Assigning Society as a primitive appetite (chap. xxx.); (11) The full formulation of the laws of development under the law of evolution (chap. xxxv.); (12) The creation of the class Re-percepts and the class Fictions among mental products (chaps. xlix., li.); (13) The complete treatment of concepts and abstracts (chap. l.); (14) The classification and treatment of pleasures and pains (Part viii.); (15) The analysis of the elements of the value of the ends and dispositions (chap. lxxiii.); (16) The new classification of mental states by which volition is eliminated (chap. xlvi.).

I have never been able to agree with the tendency existing in some quarters to limit the province of psychology and extend that of philosophy. It seems to me that the view of mind and body as a double-faced unity is the one likely to be finally received. If this be so, two grand divisions of knowledge naturally appear, somatology, or scientific knowledge of things on the material side, and psychology, or the science of things on the mental side. Out of these two grand divisions the various physical and mental sciences are carved. Thus logic, æsthetics, ethology, ethics, and the various sociological sciences are really parts of psychology. At all events they are branches of the psychological tree; and while they have their own specific range, their connection with psychology is intimate and from psychology they derive their foundation principles. Now if this view be accepted, philosophy is the unification of somatology and psychology in exhibiting the principles which connect the material and the mental spheres. It must hence be only a theory of knowledge and a correlative theory of being. It is the bridge which unites the material and mental worlds. Hence it would be, for example, far more proper to designate Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Psychology, Sociology and Ethics*, a *System of Psychology*, and his *First Principles* a *System of Philosophy*, than to characterise the whole series of his works by the latter term. A system of philosophy is not a bundle of different sciences. And while psychology need not (and should not) embrace all the details, subordinate principles and facts of logic and ethics, for instance, it should supply the foundations for those sciences, exhibiting their basic principles as a part of psycho-

logy. Thus that notion of the province of the latter science which has led many English psychologists in their works to stop with the delineation of mental *processes*, disregarding the mental *products*, is, I believe, a mistaken one. Without an examination of mental phenomena as products, that is to say on the static side, a science of psychology is incomplete. Such products form points of departure for the development of logic, ethics, and other like sciences.

Having settled in my own mind my psychology and formulated it, the most important part of my projected work was accomplished, however imperfectly. Without a psychology everything was chaotic ; with it, the whole world of mental objects—of both intelligence and volition—became orderly, and what man could do and what he ought to do became in the main clear. My attention then turned itself to practical problems. The basis of ethics had already been found in the ‘Psychology,’ and it was next in order to consider ethical questions. So much had been done by others in the way of expounding the theory of ethics in which I had come to rest, that it seemed to me I could do a better work if I presented my thoughts in this department as an Introduction to the Practical Sciences, showing that the general practical problem is to minimise evil, and for the solution of this problem indicating the nature of evil, mapping out the four great departments for labour to that end—the Industrial, the Political, the Philanthropic, and the Educational—and then exhibiting and discussing some of the principal obstacles which lie in the way of effort to reduce and abolish human woe. This plan resulted in the publication of ‘The Problem of Evil.’

It has been surprising to me to find myself

charged with violence and intemperance of language in this work as against Christianity. If this be so, I am sorry; for I thoroughly appreciate, as the critic of the 'Spectator' reminds me, that 'hard words break no bones.' Moreover, no good purpose is served by intemperate expression. But except with regard to a few isolated paragraphs, perhaps, I am not disposed to acknowledge the justice of the accusation. On the contrary, a book cannot, it seems to me, be regarded as in anywise an assault upon Christianity, whose conclusions are that non-religious, scientific investigation and thought issue in presenting as a necessity for the most complete elimination of evil, exactly the same thing to be attained, as the Christian system demands; namely, the modification and transformation of individual dispositions to conform to the Law of Love. This places Science and Religion on the same platform for practical work, leaving open for dispute only questions of method. If there be severe criticism of some theological doctrines (as I admit there is in my book), this would seem to be of less moment than not only the concession of the paramount value of what the church claims that it is pre-eminently labouring for so far as human society is concerned, but also the laying of a distinct and strong emphasis thereon. Yet only two religious authorities among my reviewers have seemed to see this. And if theological readers find their own general doctrine affirmed even with invective against particular dogmas, it might be well for them to consider again whether or not these latter may not be, after all, as contended in 'The Problem of Evil,' obstructive of the very ends they propose to themselves as the chief.

It has for a long time been my belief that one of the most important departments for the application of ethical principles has been sadly neglected. There has never been to my mind any adequate treatment of the Ethics of Sex-Relations. I therefore prepared a treatise on that subject in five Essays : 'Love'; 'Marriage'; 'Divorce'; 'Extra-marital Relationships'; 'Woman.' This was substantially completed in 1884, but has not yet been published, though once referred to in 'The Problem of Evil.' I have refrained from publication because I wished to give the book more mature thought. The volume will be about the size of the one just named, and the discussions of its various topics are, I hope, more thorough than is usual on such themes. Inasmuch as some of the ideas therein contained, since the Essays were written, have been suggested by others here and there, I desire to put on record at this time the date of its completion.

For any comprehensive system of thought, it is highly essential, and indeed unavoidable, to consider religion as a phenomenon of human life. 'The Religious Sentiments of the Human Mind,' therefore, followed the works above named. This book is mainly psychological. It is intended, however, to present the outline of a science of religion, as the author deems such a science should be constructed. But it is merely an outline and makes no pretence to an exhaustive treatment of the subject, like the work of Dr. Martineau, for instance, which was published about the same time. Yet the writer hopes it exhibits the true scientific method of dealing with religious questions.

The organic connection of human beings with

each other in society naturally claimed attention, after the foregoing topics. With this subject the present volume deals. While its point of view, and probably its illustrations, are more distinctively American than those of any of my former works, I shall venture to include it in the series published in England, hoping that my friends in that country may desire to look at it. Besides, my relations with my publishers have been so agreeable that really I should not feel at home with any others. Inasmuch as authors do not always have this experience, I am very glad to mention it. This essay on Social Progress is substantially the introduction to a longer work, upon which I am engaged, entitled 'The Fundamental Rights of Man,' which will treat of the nature, meaning, and extent of the rights to Life, Liberty, and Property.

I owe it to myself to elaborate, as a part of my philosophical task, a Theory of Knowledge and of Being. This is partially completed, and will be advanced as fast as my opportunities will allow.

I have given this account of the manner in which I have thus far (at the age of 38) followed out the scheme of systematic thought projected twenty years ago, not because I place any extravagant value upon the results actually achieved, but because, as suggested at the beginning of this preface, I think it well to record the fact that in these busy times a man can, if he will, devote himself somewhat to the pursuits of the student and the scholar at the same time that he is engaged with the practical concerns of professional or business life. The superstition is very prevalent that the pursuit of philosophy and the pursuit of the 'hundred dollars' are quite incompatible; and I

should be glad if I could do something to dispel the illusion. Mr. Herbert Spencer told me at the time of the publication of the 'Psychology' that he thought I would eventually either give up my studies, or my professional practice. This has not been, nor is it likely to be, the case. Another highly-valued English friend once expressed to me his satisfaction that philosophy was passing out of the hands of 'counsellors-at-law' and into those of academic teachers. This of course is eminently desirable, as everybody knows who observes how philosophy is manufactured and taught in many of our institutions of learning : but still, I must confess that in my wickeder moments I indulge the hope that I shall not be the last counsellor-at-law who devotes himself and gives expression to systematic thought, be it more or less philosophical.

DANIEL GREENLEAF THOMPSON.

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
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
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PART I.

THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS.





CHAPTER I.

LIBERTY AND LAW.

EVERY individual has some idea of his own advancement. Whatever his condition, there are always some things which he would like to have added unto him. Even the most favoured think of their advantages as means for acquiring something more. The wealthy man desires more riches; the powerful man more power; the famous man more fame. They believe that unto him that hath should be given. On the other hand the poor and the needy are impelled by necessity to strive to better their condition, else that condition becomes so wretched that they perish. High and low, rich and poor, powerful and impotent—all have ideals of an improved status that furnish to them ends of activity which they are ever seeking to attain.

Closely bound up with this ideal of individual betterment is an ideal of social improvement. Men have dwelt temporarily in isolation, but no human being, so far as we can learn, ever lived without a mental life modified in some degree by thoughts of others of his kind. Everywhere, among savages and civilised, there exists and is recognised some sort of social relation between men. Hence, notions of a

better state of things for society inevitably follow ideas of an improved condition for the individual. The question, What is a better society? will, indeed, be answered very differently by different individuals. To the cannibal chief the better social state may be one in which people are fatter and thus more edible, and perhaps more complaisant on the subject of being killed and eaten. The warrior dreams of communities wherein military activity is stimulated, where men are well-trained for battle and eager for the fray. To the merchant absorbed in trade, commercial enterprise and its results promise a realisation of his highest ideals. The heaven of the artist and man of literature is similarly coloured by the nature of their pursuits. But even if the improvement of society consists in the selfish aggrandisement of the individual, he still entertains social progress as an end along with individual progress. The two are always in some manner connected, because men dwell together in society.

If there be individual progress there must be room for its march; if there be the other, for that too room must be allowed. But when many different individuals entertain widely divergent or totally opposed views of their own relations to others and thus to society, collisions necessarily arise. No individual is satisfied with another's idea of social good when the latter involves, for example, the inferiority of the former in power, place, or wealth, and the exaltation of the latter. Without restraint the social purposes of antagonistic individuals will destroy each other, and the ideal of social progress in men's minds will

arise only to be defeated in its movements toward realisation.

This restraint is furnished by Law. We find not infrequently in communities of all times that self-control by which a man is a law unto himself for the good of all, but we more often encounter an absence of self-restraint in which one seeks only that he may be a law unto others and be himself independent of law. In such case as the last mentioned, there must either be war, which is the destruction of society, or there must be a power sufficient to impose a restraint in the social interest, which must somehow be defined and declared. A man by his own strength and prowess may defend himself and maintain his life, but he does it at the sacrifice of that satisfaction which the social part of his nature craves. He may, indeed, do without this for a time; but sooner or later his gregarious inclinations will assert themselves, and then returns the problem of how to maintain society and promote social progress.

Every one likes to have his own way; no one cares to be restrained. Moreover, restraint tends to suppress spontaneous activity; if it be too absolute it not only prevents action but it quenches enthusiasm, weakens energy and hinders development. It opposes progress of the individual, and thus may be an opponent to social progress. If absence of restraint is dangerous and destructive, so also is too much restraint. Thus the general condition essential to social progress is the establishment of an equilibrium between Liberty and Law. Neither can be dispensed with, and neither can be permitted unqualified supre-

macy over the other. But since there is in the nature of things an apparent conflict between the two, how is any stable equilibrium possible? Is not the antagonism irrepressible, and is not the best status we can look forward to one of an armed peace, with war likely to be precipitated whenever the resisting power of either party falls below the strength of its opponent's aggressiveness? Questions like these are the most important to be answered in determining the conditions of progress.

CHAPTER II.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY.

It does not imply materialism to declare a strict and close analogy between physical and mental life. Whatever may be our theories of the nature and connection of mind and body, there is admitted on all hands to be a correspondence and parallelism between the functional processes of the two. At any rate the law of evolution governs both; and the individual human being, whatever may be the ultimate origin and destiny of his conscious personality, is so placed in the natural physical world that his life is determined by action and reaction of his organism and its environment. Natural law governs his mental as well as his physical life. Now the latter is a growth, and consists in a continuous series of changes. 'Life is the evolution and integration of an organism. Death is the dissolution and disintegration of an organism. An organism is said to be *living* while the processes of evolution and integration of the organism as a whole are going on; an organism is said to be *dead* when such processes of evolution and integration have ceased and there remain in operation only processes of dissolution and disintegration.'¹ The law of evolution is

¹ *System of Psychology*, by the present writer, vol. i. ch. xix. p. 5.

that there is in nature universally a course of integration of forces from indefiniteness, simplicity and homogeneity in their relations, to definiteness, complexity and heterogeneity;¹ when this movement is stopped a reverse movement follows. The course of evolution then involves continuous movement, and in the human organism this is a process of selection of assimilable material from the outside world, of assimilation when taken within, and of expulsion of non-assimilable or disintegrated matters. There is perpetual interaction between the organism and its surroundings. If this movement is stopped the animal or the plant dies; if its free play is interfered with, there is deficiency of growth or positive disease. All these are familiar facts.

The accomplishment of this process of evolution involves a spontaneous activity of the organism moving outward and also a resistance to forces impinging. The natural structure of the organism exhibits such an arrangement of forces that this course of adaptation proceeds naturally in their development. In animals we note countless instinctive movements in furtherance of evolution. These inherited pre-arrangements of the structural constitution cause functional action along the lines of evolutionary development toward an accuracy of adjustment that is truly wonderful. If this were not so, the organism would speedily perish. In addition, as sentience appears there is a guidance of action to the same end under the stimuli of pleasure and pain. Moreover, as consciousness grows there comes a volitional movement, resulting in action;

¹ *System of Psychology*, ch. xvii. p. 20.

which volition is governed by feeling indeed, but with the higher authority of intelligence superimposed.

When intelligence takes the helm, definite ends of attainment appear, and the mind forecasting settles upon certain things to be done and certain things to be gained by action. These, however, are in furtherance of the evolution of the individual's life. He has certain organic appetites to support the demands of nature, and to satisfy these his activity must be directed. Pleasure if he succeeds in satisfying them, and pain if he does not, govern his volitions. His ends are formed accordingly; and they as well as the means for gathering them are immediate or remote, intermediate or final, direct or indirect, corresponding to the reach of his intelligence. But whatever may be the mode of exercise, one thing is certain, that activity or movement there must be. If life requires movement, consciousness requires movement. So long as the organism lives the mind must be active in some degree. Consciousness is movement, and that too in furtherance or avoidance of definite objects somehow related to the pleasure and pain of the individual, and thus to the development or retardation of his life.

Liberty, when analysed, is resolvable into Freedom of Movement. If a man is bound in a strait-jacket and confined in a cell he is undoubtedly deprived of liberty. So also if he is imprisoned without the strait-jacket. His movements are circumscribed or prevented. Whatever hinders, abates or prevents action is a restraint upon liberty. But to accomplish this it is not necessary that a person be literally chained or bound with thongs or withes. The ability to forecast

the result of actions enables him to know in advance the consequences of what he proposes to do, and to proceed or forbear accordingly. A simple prohibition may then be a restraint upon liberty as fully (though perhaps not as surely) as an actual physical confinement. If a child understands that fire burns, it is ordinarily not necessary to tie his hands to keep them out of the fire. The knowledge operates as a check upon his action. Conduct is governed by foresight, not always correct of course, but as accurate as the experience and acuteness of the individual will allow.

It thus appears that the idea of liberty springs from a natural appetite which is grounded in a necessity of organic life. The appetite for movement is as prominent as that for rest or alimentation, and activity itself in some degree is as essential to existence as food and drink. And, as for the end of satisfying the constitutional wants of human beings desires arise toward objects of action or acquisition, we find the particular applications of the idea of liberty in the affairs of man influenced and determined by these desires. The love of liberty then is as natural and as inevitable as the love of life. It really is a form of the latter, because restraint of freedom if carried too far becomes a menace to life, and if made more absolute will destroy life, surely though it may be slowly.

But wholly unregulated movement is as fatal as is suppression of movement. The whole course of nature is a process of educating vital activity to move in certain lines favouring natural development and avoiding destructive forces. To accomplish this opposition, repression and restraint are requisite.

Human intelligence perceives this and is willing to submit to control or direction when in furtherance of its own personal ends. A desire known to be of injurious tendency will awaken another desire to combat it. An end of effort clearly formed must give way to a higher end of greater value. Thus in the individual character, quite irrespective of interferences from other men, along with dispositions toward movement and activity there proceed inclinations toward self-control, which will enable the person to direct his activity and use it to his best advantage. This self-control can only be acquired through conflict of volitions and repression of some of them.

While, therefore, the nature of man is such as to require liberty ; that nature also maintains a principle of self-conservation which demands that a check be put upon activity in harmful directions. Liberty is only a minister to the development of life, and when it interferes with and is subversive of this development, the fact that the desire for it is formed in nature is no reason against its limitation.

In truth, when a person is moved toward courses of action which he knows are destructive, he is no longer free. His will is constrained and he becomes a bond-servant to desires which he would prefer to oppose and overcome. In order to preserve his liberty he must maintain by restraint a balance between various inclinations, by which he can govern his action and do what his judgment tells him is best.

CHAPTER III.

SOCIAL LIBERTY.

THE individual man in his growth deals with inorganic and with organic nature below the human in two ways. He brings near that which he can utilise and utilises it, and he repels or avoids that which he esteems of no value or positively injurious. With reference to this environment, his purposes are entirely egoistic. We need not now consider sympathies for lower animals, which might qualify the above remark. He uses nature for his own ends ; and while he is compelled to allow the power of physical forces to affect his own life and thus is obliged to employ them and to counteract them, he never thinks of them as having any ends of their own which he is bound to serve. The idea of being of use to a physical force is an absurdity. One cannot think of the wind, the lightning, or even a tree, a flower or an insect, as having objects, ends, purposes, of which men can take account.

When, however, other human beings appear, a new principle comes in. The individual indeed can and does treat his fellow as he treats animals. He attempts to use him, and if he cannot he avoids or destroys him. But in the endeavour to utilise he speedily discovers the new principle. He learns that

this fellow-creature acts according to volitions which are governed and determined by his pleasure and pain. If he is hurt he fights back or runs away ; if he is pleased he remains. If he cannot get away he will labour under the lash, but his work is of inferior quality and he must be watched constantly. His regularity cannot be depended upon as can the certainty of a stream of water passing over a wheel or even of the ox that treadeth the corn. The way to make him thoroughly useful is to make him desire to be useful. Such a desire can only be evoked by some pleasurable imagination ; that is to say, he must believe that the service is in furtherance of some end of his own formed in his own mind and appertaining to his own personality. Hence, in order to use other individuals for my benefit, I cannot safely deal with them as I would deal with physical forces ; but I must recognise a personality like my own, whose actions obey the laws of intellect, feeling and will. I cannot succeed, save imperfectly, unless I create a disposition to serve me. Such a disposition cannot be formed without the idea that assisting me favours the ends of the other, that what is done for my advantage contributes to the maintenance and development of the life of the doer. There must be some reciprocity of service and respect even on the part of the master toward the slave, else the latter is not usable.

The other course is that of conflict and destruction, or avoidance. Fighting involves risk on both sides. If I attempt to kill another man, I endanger myself. If I succeed in despatching him, the Avenger of Blood may slay me. If I am cunning and place my foe at

so great a disadvantage that I feel sure of victory, still there is some peril. I may have miscalculated and underestimated the strength or the skill of my opponent. At best war is a desperate game. Moreover, I cannot slay every other human being. If one is killed, another has to be reckoned with, and the same problem presents itself. I am obliged to get along somehow with others of my kind. I cannot run amuck without insuring my own speedy destruction.

If avoidance be attempted, it will be found practically impossible. Men and women do not spring full-grown and full-armed from the head of Zeus. There is a period of infancy, of childhood, of dependence. The family relation is necessarily a social relation. Besides, families are not found in isolation, unless in exceptional and abnormal cases. To put one's self out of contact with others of his species would require much study and very persistent work. If theoretically it would be possible, practically it is not. Society is the natural condition.

This brings us to the strongest consideration of all. Men live in society because they have a natural appetite for the amicable presence of their fellows. The inclinations springing from difference of sex are a powerful force of attraction. They, together with the parental affections, produce a disinterested sentiment, the essence of which is the spirit of service to another personality. The mind thus actually comes to find its pleasure, its happiness, its ends of effort in the welfare and happiness of that other. Self-abnegation, altruism, love, thus become an impelling and

governing energy in human conduct, since they are natural elements of human constitution.

Nor is this the whole of the matter. The presence of these innate sympathies, of this social appetite, requires opportunity for their satisfaction in the development of mind. As mental operations increase in complexity and definiteness, ends of volition and action which involve the social intercourse of men multiply vastly. Interests, though selfish, become of such a character that they can only be subserved by a social life. The assistance of others is demanded to obtain food, clothing, and shelter, for help in sickness, for protection against enemies. The desire for power becomes a desire for power over other men. Wealth is of value chiefly for social advantages. Fame and reputation are absolutely dependent upon a social state. It thus speedily happens that even for the necessities of life the action of other people is sought, and that the most engrossing objects of human pursuit demand for their attainment a social condition. Mind requires for its healthy growth an environment of other minds. From them it must obtain nourishment. Its pleasures become of a social character, and its ends toward which its governing volitions are directed are ends to be gained only by a social assimilation.

It was noticed in the preceding chapter that actual physical force is not the only restraint on liberty, but that the prevention of action through anticipation of ills to follow it is as real an interference with freedom as chains or imprisonment. Extending the application of this thought, it may now be remarked that

any such condition of things as prevents activity to realise purposes which spring from desires founded in the natural constitution is an abridgment of liberty. Having given men and women dwelling in propinquity ; if there be a state of hostility, there is no opportunity for satisfying the social volitions nor for obtaining those objects which appertain to them. It is thus rendered impossible to enter into and cultivate, save very imperfectly, a vast region which lies open to the vision of human imagination, and toward which as a field for activity some of the strongest instincts and appetites are continually urging people. Men see the advantages which result from society ; they appreciate, indeed, the necessity of society and form countless ideal ends which can only be realised in a settled social order. Hence anything tending to prevent the maintenance of such an order becomes a check upon individual liberty, and whatever makes for its preservation, works at the same time an extension of such liberty.

It may be said that it is natural for man to hate his brother and to be a murderer ; that the aggressive, predatory instincts are as much natural elements in human constitution as are the social, and indeed more so ; that if a person is prevented from attacking his fellow it is also an infringement of liberty ; that he can choose his own society among his kin, and that the liberty of warring on anybody else is more precious to him than any possible developments of a social state wherein this freedom is denied. It may be urged, in a word, that if we base the rights of liberty upon the nature of man, the right to rob

and murder would take precedence of every other, and there is no justification for any restraint. The answer to this line of argument is, I conceive, that, except among the lowest savages perhaps, social ends are more commanding and social desires are more imperious than the predatory. As a fact men do live gregariously, and just as soon as intelligence begins to reach beyond seeking means to satisfy immediate wants, it commences to find its ends and purposes in fellowship relations of one sort or another. If this were not true we should not discover that persistent re-formation of social groups when war breaks them up. Destruction of societies has been going on from the beginning of the world, but such ruin has always been followed by the establishment of new ones. More, even; the destructive movements themselves have generally been in the name and avowedly for the sake of a better order. The difficulty has always been, not that men did not desire a condition of social stability, but they were mistaken as to the true methods of securing it. The history of the human race reveals a never-ceasing attempt to establish such a status that men may dwell together in society and develop their social dispositions in all directions undisturbed by the fear of social disruption.

If, even in comparatively primitive conditions, the wisdom of that precept of King Archidamus is recognised wherein he declares that 'it is most honourable and most secure for many persons to show themselves obedient to the same order;' how much more is such wisdom apparent with the advancement of civilisation! Such an obedience becomes absolutely essential.

The natural tendency of civilised development is toward a specialisation of functions on the part of individuals. One man raises grain; another mills it; another dispenses it. This man is a soldier, that man prepares sustenance. One is for the field, another for the hearth. Every one is dependent upon others, and unless each is free and unimpeded in his work others suffer. So complete is this interdependence that we find the most accurate description of a society which can be given, to be in likening it to an organism wherein each part is at once the means and end of all the rest.

Again, the progress of civilisation has worked out another result. By affording facilities for quick communication science has brought nearly the whole human race within the rule of social law. The same interdependence which is exhibited in a small community begins to be felt increasingly between people who are widely separated. The work of the Chinese is desired by the European or the American, while the products of the latter are sought after by the former, against ancient and very obstinate prejudice. It is quite impossible to say that any community is independent of any other on the face of the globe, if only there be lines of communication between them.

It thus becomes apparent that, except within a very limited range, wholly inadequate to the wants of any but men of the lowest intelligence, individual liberty can only find the satisfaction of its desires, can only have its ends subserved, can only secure its natural development in a society wherein men dwell together in organic relations, each being both the

means for the purposes of others, and at the same time and not the less, the end of their activity. This requires a Social Liberty. Such a liberty is the actual recognition of each member of the community as a personality with rights, to whom the rest owe duties and the limitation of the acts of every one by those rights and duties. It is imperative for the liberty of each individual that the liberty of all others be respected. Otherwise, society tends to fall asunder, and every one is in danger of losing the very advantages which he hopes to gain from the social state. Superficially, the individual appears in the latter case to have a greater freedom; really he has much less. He is cut off from activity in the directions which his own will would choose, and he cannot get those things which he has come to esteem most desirable.

We are forced to this conclusion, therefore; that individual liberty cannot long subsist, nor reach any degree of perfection or completeness at all commensurate with its own demands, without the maintenance of a social liberty; that the latter can only exist and be conserved through a check upon the wills and actions of the individuals composing a society, imposed upon them by the practical recognition of reciprocal rights and duties as existing between man and man.

CHAPTER IV.

LAW INDISPENSABLE TO SOCIAL LIBERTY.

WHEN Blackstone remarked that 'the only true and natural foundations of society are the wants and fears of individuals,' he expressed a fact out of which grows the necessity of law. However extensively the ideal of social order prevails in the minds of men, it is extremely difficult for them to do the things requisite for realising and maintaining such an order. They may desire social liberty, but they will not contribute to its maintenance by their own example. They prefer that other people shall furnish the meekness and the submission. A man wants a great many things, and to obtain his will he is certain to infringe upon the rights of others, unless there be some restraint. He must be made afraid of evil consequences to himself, if he persists.

This is perfectly natural. There is no way of regulating and directing movement except by resistance and counteraction. If it were not for resistance in the physical world, everything would fly in pieces and chaos would come. The animal's spontaneous vital action stimulates muscular motions in all directions, which follow the lines of least resistance. These lines may lead to his destruction, but he will pursue them unless prevented. His prescience of harm given

him by his experience will often operate as a deterrent but frequently it will not, and he will go on to his death unless stopped by some *vis major*. Similarly, in the human individual, children must be taught from early infancy to do certain things and not to do others, else their lives would speedily be abridged, or if prolonged would proceed with no power of self-direction. Teaching is done by exercising constraint and restraint. Though the discipline of fear is by no means the whole of education, it is indispensable in some degree. It is primary and fundamental, furnishing the basis for establishing character.

In like manner, when the period of youthful tutelage is past, the man's activity will follow those lines wherein resistance is least. If the education of character were perfect and knowledge were complete, the resisting force to desires conflicting with social liberty might be furnished by the mind of each individual. But such is far from being the case. People do not see clearly; and their dispositions are not right. They even deceive themselves as to their own purposes. And to reach the same end a great variety of conflicting means is often proposed. Unless then a common restraint is imposed, a state of conflict will exist in itself destructive of social liberty, and there will be no such condition of peace and order as will admit of the growth of a governing disposition to obey the requirements of that liberty.

The assertion, therefore, that law is necessary to social liberty means that there must be in the minds of men the apprehension and approval of a common rule of right and duty binding upon all individuals,

and an enforcement of that rule by actual restraint upon conduct, wherever necessary, through a power sufficient for its ends, acting in the interest of the general freedom. As in the bodily organism there must be resisting surfaces which by a restraining opposition direct and govern the functional processes, so that all parts shall be properly nourished and no one be developed to the detriment of the rest; and as in the growth of the individual mind only by a similar course of action and resistance can a harmonious and well-balanced, self-directing character be secured: so in that organic relationship of men which we call a society there must be a structural unity made by a law common to all, which constitutes the bones, the muscles, the skin, the tissues, the resisting surfaces, in the midst of which and governed by which the vital action of individuals proceeds in its various modes to promote the health of the whole. Without such law an organic union of men in society is impossible; the social organism dies.

All history furnishes demonstration of the necessity of positive law with machinery to enforce it. Wherever we find men dwelling together, there we observe law and government existing, in however rude a fashion. Some authority superior to individual volition and controlling individual action is always apparent among savages and the civilised alike. That such is the case historically does not need detailed illustration. Our present object has been to explain this universal fact in the light of the general facts of human nature itself. We need not seek for such an explanation in any doctrine of general

depravity and exceptional excellence, nor do we need to appeal to supernatural commands. The laws of nature as it is, and of the human constitution in particular, brought out by scientific examination of the facts, show clearly how it is and why it is that law is essential to liberty. Godwin was not far from right, though he did not state the case completely, when he said: 'The only sufficient reason that can be offered for the institution of government is a fatal and indispensable necessity.' If he had said 'natural' instead of 'fatal,' and included the idea of government as the instrument of law, his enunciation would have been unexceptionable as a generalisation for political science, though we should have still to go back to psychology for the *ultima ratio*. Law is a natural necessity because the social relationship of men is naturally organic, made so by the natural appetites and wants of individual human beings; and the social organism cannot live without a resisting and controlling structure connecting all parts for the conservation of each.

CHAPTER V.

SECURITY.


LAW being necessary to social liberty, its office is evident and its own limitations may be indicated. Law is a means to liberty and should be maintained for its sake only. Law is made for liberty, not liberty for law. Governmental administration is primarily for the purpose of preserving the common freedom, the essential condition of which is that each member of the community shall be secure in the enjoyment of his rights, which themselves are limited only by the rights of others. 'I call the citizens of a state secure,' said Wilhelm von Humboldt,¹ 'when, living together in the full enjoyment of their due rights of person and property, they are out of the reach of any external disturbance from the encroachments of others; and hence I would call *security* (if the expression does not seem too brief for distinctness) the *assurance of legal freedom*.' Men make for themselves plans of action which involve a career, or course of life, extending forward into the future and having indefinite limits. Each one desires the development of his life to its full measure of completeness, and inasmuch as he has the power to determine his future, at least to some extent, he wishes to be secure against interferences on the part of other men. He needs

¹ *Sphere and Duties of Government.*

the assurance of liberty, else his activity will be paralysed.

Thus a condition of stability is of the first importance to social liberty. If what is to-day may be overturned to-morrow, no one can predicate anything on the existing status and there is no encouragement for enterprise of any kind. Every individual is obliged to prepare himself for self-defence and that is all he can do. Really there is no liberty, for though he may for the moment be dwelling in peace with his neighbours, he must be ready for war on the morrow ; and he can only stand and wait, prevented by the situation from pursuing his own ends. It has often been claimed that a stable social order with imperfect liberty is better than one wherein there is nominally a greater liberty with little assurance of its continuance. There may be some force in such an argument, but there would be more if it were not for the fact that this greater stability is generally secured at the expense of all opportunity for improvement in respect to liberty until the very idea of individual liberty is deemed offensive, whatever is allowed being regarded as a boon, not a right. Nevertheless, stability of law, and uniformity in its administration, are necessary to any social liberty worthy of the name, and thus necessary for individual liberty as well.

Appertaining to such stability is certainty. This involves both certainty in declaration and in execution. If individual action is to be governed by law, the law itself must be clearly and definitely enunciated and it must be unfailingly and consistently enforced. Otherwise, there is no law at all ; and the pretence of



it only serves as a cover for plans of individual domination. Human language is indeed imperfect and human wills are weak, so that it may be more easy to perceive and assert the necessity of certainty in both the respects named than actually to obtain it. But so far forth as it is wanting social liberty is endangered; and if law is to be supreme within its sphere the highest possible ideal of its effectiveness must be held up before men's minds and the most earnest efforts made to realise that ideal.

The security of the individual in the enjoyment of his rights, in the pursuit of his ends as limited by the requirements of social liberty is a fundamental social necessity. There is no development of liberty without it. It is of the essence of social liberty. Indeed, the problem of governmental administration is primarily a question how to obtain and guarantee security. Government may do more than this, but this at least it must do. Very much is to be said as to the means to be employed to give to every one a complete 'assurance of legal freedom,' and as to the difficulties in the way. There is room for serious dispute over particular laws and measures, over forms of government and details of administration. It is by no means easy to determine in every case what is necessary for security and what is likely to impair it. Some of these questions are beyond the scope of this volume: others will receive attention and perhaps a degree of elucidation in subsequent chapters. The general statements above made are sufficient to show the primary necessity of security as a condition of progress.

CHAPTER VI.

EQUALITY IN RIGHTS.

I HAVE spoken of social liberty as involving for its maintenance a limitation of individual action. This is necessitated by the wants of other individuals. In order that men may be means to each other they must also be ends. This restriction of action is recognised as essential by men dwelling in society. They at least desire to be secure themselves from the encroachments of other people, and thus are theoretically willing to submit to a law for all. Practically, however, they are inclined to conform as little as possible to the rules which they seek to impose upon others. The law thus furnishes a resisting barrier against which their force directs itself; if that barrier is strong, the assailing current is diverted and controlled; if it be weak, it may be broken through or overthrown.

If there is to be any structural constitution of society which affords security to one against the interferences of others, it must consist in effective law, applied without distinction of person. Otherwise the tendency is to destroy the organic relationship between man and man, which is requisite for society's existence, and, as we have seen, for the development of individual man and the satisfaction

of man's wants. If one may do what another may not under the same circumstances, the social bond is thereby weakened. For, in such case, each individual ceases to be a personality having ends which all others are bound to respect, and becomes degraded to the position of mere means to the ends of some other. This he will not submit to, unless he is obliged by force. He will resist if he thinks he can do so successfully. Hence, instead of an order having intrinsically the elements of stability, that unstable equilibrium is created whose maintenance depends upon force. The moment the weaker becomes the stronger, there is a *bouleversement*, which produces a chaotic condition with ruin of all sorts.

Consequently, if liberty is to be preserved and developed, if there is to be security to the individual in the pursuit of his happiness; there must be an equality of legal restriction upon individual acts. This is what we mean by justice, and without this the tendencies of communities is toward the anarchy of the primitive state, wherein each man's hand is raised against his neighbour. The preservation of equal rights is much more than a matter of expediency, or of comparative utility: it is necessary for social progress, for society itself, because of underlying elements of human constitution, of facts in the natural history of man. The political law must be as inflexible and as uniform as physical law. As in the physical world the uniformity of nature is the condition for all evolutionary movement; so in the social sphere, the uniformity of governmental law is

necessary to furnish that permanent stability along which and guided by which progressive changes can alone take place.

The community is made up of individuals, and in the absence of these there is no community, commonwealth or state. Social progress is accomplished only through the development of individuals in one direction or another. Individual human beings have within themselves the stimulus to their own growth. They require only a favouring and nourishing environment in order that their native powers may exercise themselves and their activities be put forth for ends which their own minds set before them. All they need is that the field be kept clear for their efforts. They must be secure and have the feeling of security ; then they will project, work, and achieve. This feeling is of something common to all and usable by all, as the air is for all to breathe. Men are not equal in endowments, nor can they be equal in their individual developments. Variety, unlikeness, heterogeneity must always be characteristic of social progress : but in order to its accomplishment in a natural order there must be a homogeneous and uniform application, as nearly as possible, of the forces upon which society depends for its existence. As has been repeatedly observed, the social *nexus* is the recognition of each individual man as an end to which others are means ; because he is a man having intelligence, feeling and will, and thereby entitled to the development of his own life to its fullest perfection.

Equality of rights means equality in respect to prohibition and restriction. No man shall be prevented

from doing what another, under the same circumstances, is permitted to do; and if there be no violation of law, the penalties shall be equally inflicted. Now, if law is effective it must be enforced by men. Interference by one man with another always evokes the spirit of resistance tending to conflict. If, however, a person understands that he is restrained only in the things in which every other man is restrained, he submits to the restriction with a much better grace than where another is favoured above him. Moreover, in the former case he gets little sympathy or support from his fellows, whereas in the latter a class is created of those who from one cause or another find themselves in an inferior political status, and who by parity of circumstances become themselves naturally united in opposition to the more fortunate classes, to the law, and to the administration which protects them. The disposition to rebellion is formed which superior force alone can control, which is nourished and strengthened by the sense of its natural justice, and which bides its time for successful self-assertion. In the other instance, though resistance to the administration of law may take place, it tends to subside for want of support. It cannot organise a propaganda. Sympathy, though perhaps awakened for the moment, is soon quenched, because other people have nothing to gain, but, on the contrary, something to lose if the opposition were to succeed. The vast majority of men see this, feeling it instinctively even if they are not able to give reasons for the sentiment. Consequently it is true that where rights are equal and the law justly administered the general security is pro-

moted, while if there be inequality in either respect it is imperilled. In the one situation the social bond is strengthened, in the other it is weakened; with equality the integrity of the social structure is maintained; with inequality disintegrating forces are straightway set at work.

The 'Contrat Social' of Rousseau is regarded as an erroneous and obsolete theory of human social relations. Undoubtedly it is a crude doctrine, and false as far as it purports to give an explanation of the origin of human societies. And yet it does not fail to suggest the true statement of the basis of authority of one man over another. The authority does exist by permission granted on the faith of an implied contract that the community will give to me the protection it gives to my neighbour. If this is not done, I may indeed yield to the authority because I must; but I shall not support it nor submit to it unless compelled. If I see no hope of overthrowing it openly, I will strive to undermine it. I will thwart its exercise in every way and teach my children to hate it, in the hope that in their day a favourable opportunity may occur for destroying it. I am born with a personality of my own, I am an end unto myself. I will follow my own ideals and obey my own behests. If I allow other men to restrict my action, it is upon the condition that all others shall be equally restricted for the common good; for my benefit as well as for that of my fellows. If this cannot be, I owe nothing to others. I will defend myself with the sword if attacked. I can at least die, feeling that the unknown, whether for good or for ill, is preferable to known and certain evils. Such a

spirit as this is natural and inevitable in human beings. It has always been developed in the face of tyranny and class supremacy, and always will be. It is the spirit which, if respected, is the strongest promotive force of social progress, and which, if despised, will sooner or later demolish any governmental and political *régime*, however firmly established and powerfully supported by bayonets and cannon.

Such an implied contract, of course, never arose from an original express contract by which society was founded, but rather out of the natural conditions which exist from men dwelling together and the necessity that they should live in society. But the fact that they remain in the community and partake of the advantages of a social order raises the presumption that they have agreed to obey the law which is common to all. Their enjoyment of rights creates a corresponding obligation to respect the rights of others and to submit to the same restrictions that others submit to. And even though there never was an express contract on the part of anybody, whether to do or to forbear; yet the acting or the forbearing is never divested of the idea of consideration. Implied contracts, indeed, are based upon status: that is to say, established relations more or less permanent of human beings to each other. But voluntary submission to such relations and acquiescence in them rests upon receiving at least a *quid pro quo* for what is given or forborne. If there is no adequate consideration, or if it fails; then the social *nexus* is severed, the organism perishes, and nothing but greater force destroying resistance can preserve even

the semblance of order. Antagonism, which is anti-social, takes the place of assimilation, which is the principle of social life.

No government ever existed which did not derive its actual power really (though not nominally) from the consent of the governed. Not, indeed, of *all* the governed, but of enough of them in number, in wealth, in intelligence, in power, to overcome the rebellious and defeat those anxious for a revolution. The most powerful autocrat who ever thrived would have been absolutely impotent, unless he had been supported by formidable numbers of those professedly his subjects. Without an army a despot cannot keep his throne, and his army must have its own interests promoted through the service it renders him. Its loyalty is dependent upon benefits received or expected. Even under a monarchical system of the most absolute kind, political inequality can only be maintained through a practical recognition of the principle of gift or promise and consideration. But this is the principle of equivalence; in truth the principle of equality of rights, which is thus admitted to be the true basis of social communication and assistance, without applying which, even a despotism is impossible.

It may now be seen that the difference between a state organisation wherein equality of rights does not obtain and one wherein it does, lies not in the absolute denial in the former case of the doctrine of equality nor in an entire repudiation of it in practice, but in a limitation of its application. Monarchical governments allow and enforce equality of rights between those of the same class; and such governments as

have established the most equal justice to all who are esteemed to be on a par, have been the strongest and most permanent, even though highly autocratic. But differences in position, resulting in ranks, orders, clans and castes, have always seriously interfered with and often effectively prevented a universal extension of the principle for the benefit of all within the community.

It is not to be denied that political institutions which neither admit nor justify the doctrine of equality of rights have been upheld for long periods of time and with prosperity to the peoples living under them. From this it is strongly argued that equality is by no means necessary for the general good, but on the contrary is likely to be inimical to it. I have no intention of disputing the well-known facts of history nor legitimate inferences from them : but I unhesitatingly claim that the allowance of equal rights, so far forth as it has occurred, has invariably had the tendency to promote social progress, while their denial has so far forth been subversive of such progress ; and whenever there has existed a monarchical or oligarchical *régime* which has developed prosperity, it has been because substantial equality has been maintained with even-handed justice between the members of classes great enough in number and strength to overcome the discontented and rebellious. The reasons for this contention have already been given as lying in the facts of human nature and the very constitution of society itself. But, if what I have claimed be true, the wonder is that men have been contented with imperfect and limited equality

when a more complete and universal equality is *a fortiori* desirable.

The simple answer to such a query is that they never have been content. The lowest subject classes have never been satisfied, and have only been kept in subjection by stern repression. Nor have the middle classes been wholly contented; but they have preferred their superiority over those beneath them even with the authority above, to a condition in which the lower classes are raised to their level. If they can dominate somebody else, they are willing to be themselves dominated. Yet there have always been agitations against the ruling power, necessitating strong military protection for the latter. This in turn has aroused the spirit of resistance, and political history has been a succession of wars, revolts, and revolutions in a ceaseless struggle on the one side to retain power and on the other to acquire it. So long as a soldier class, powerful enough to overcome uprisings, can be maintained whose interests lie in fealty to the ruler, his government is safe; but the inequalities within that class, and those between the military caste and the rest of the subjects, constantly develop disintegrating forces which it needs the utmost care and the use of more and more stringent measures to counteract.

A very effective support for inequality has been found, however, in the fact that those in servient and subject conditions, when they are released from their bonds, though woefully taught in the school of oppression, seek only to become themselves oppressors. Unquestionably a known tyranny, whose

methods of operation are understood and to which men have learned to accommodate themselves is far preferable to a new and unsettled despotism. Even a mad despot will have method in his madness. He will have his habits of tyranny, and when these are known it is possible to forefend and avoid. But under a new despotism there must be a period of great uncertainty, till the policy of government be settled. Distrust and terror are widespread. The social condition is anarchic; no dependence can be placed on anything. And knowing the general disposition of those freed from servitude to abuse liberty and to disregard the rights of others, a large body of conservative people has always been found, even in communities conspicuously oppressed by the ruling power, who prefer to endure the existing ills rather than face the risks and uncertainties of a destruction of the governmental machinery under whose operation they suffer so many things.

Notwithstanding all this, the truth remains, as remarked at the beginning of the chapter, that a condition of inequality of rights is a condition of unstable equilibrium surely tending to chaos. The employment of physical force by one human being against another is an act intrinsically anti-social. It thus ought to be used as a purely defensive measure, to supply an effective resistance to the action of the man who attacks or encroaches upon the rights of another. When it goes beyond this it necessarily destroys the conditions of social growth. Now the only way in which any claim to vested rights of government or of class superiority can be success-

fully asserted is by means of physical force. The military power becomes dominant, and war and the shedding of blood are looked upon as praiseworthy and glorious. This very fact stimulates the disposition toward organised opposition. The king's soldier upon occasion is ready to fight for the bold rebel. In order to its preservation, the military power must keep on strengthening itself and grinding down those under its domination. Hence the energies of individuals are quenched, assimilation between members of the community is checked, antagonisms are everywhere generated, the functional activities of the organism are destroyed, and social retrogression goes on steadily to disintegration and dissolution.

The equilibrium becomes the more unstable as intelligence waxes and civilisation increases. Knowledge is power. If people know their rights, after a while they will dare maintain them. Means of subtly opposing brute force will be devised more generally and be more successfully practised. To be sure, if the spread of knowledge enables the subject classes to mine, it will teach their oppressors the more effectually to countermine; but, on the whole, the advantage will be with the former, because they constitute the more numerous class. The power which knowledge gives will be greater in amount on the side of the oppressed than on the side of the dominant party. This, after a time, will be appreciated by both; and when the conditions are ripe, a rising will take place, and the revolution accomplish itself—perhaps, too, with ease; for victory in a battle does not necessitate that one army shall exterminate the

other, but occurs when the situation becomes such on the one side or the other as to make it evident that further resistance is hopeless. It is, therefore, always a wise policy on the part of tyrants to discourage education. The ignorant, semi-civilised man has fewer wants, to begin with; and even should desires be awakened, if he lacks knowledge he cannot gain his ends, but is kept the more readily in subjection. He can be made to worship his Czar as his God, and to believe that in serving his monarch he is attaining the summit of human happiness. But once let the key of knowledge unlock the door, and his eye behold the vision of the vast possibilities of individual development; then he becomes a new man. Then all his activities are quickened, and if he cannot lift off the weight which crushes him, he will circumvent it, as the growing tree shoots its trunk from underneath, around, and finally above the stone at its root. In a world which has reached our earth's present development in science and the arts, no government can much longer subsist in any enlightened country save on the basis of a full acknowledgment of the equality of all in the fundamental rights of man to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And this we may affirm, not because the wish is the father of the thought, but from a scientific examination of the conditions of human life and society.

The circumstance that in some cases, where the government is weak under a system of equal rights theoretically conceded, there is disorder leading perhaps to practical inequality, is no argument against

the position we have taken, but rather furnishes more proof of its soundness. For in such case the difficulty which ensues is precisely that equal rights are not securely maintained. The fault lies with the government, because of its inefficiency. The question which then arises is, whether a government to enforce equality in general can be successful, except upon a basis of conceded inequality. The fact that it can be is evidenced by the national career of the United States of America, not to seek for other examples. If, then, the inevitable and necessary tendency of a government claiming for some political rights which to others are denied be, as I have endeavoured to show, toward dissolution and social retrogression, is it not better to strengthen the government of equal rights within its limited sphere, rather than to remove the limitations and allow it a more absolute power?

How this can best be done we shall consider in subsequent chapters. Enough has now been said, I think, to make plain that the social principle requires equality of rights for the maintenance of society, and that the points for discussion are solely questions of the extent of the application of the doctrine. The subject to be dealt with comes to be the existence and mutual relations of classes occupying a different status in the community. Lesser societies are created within the greater. The mutual antagonisms of these subordinate unions promote instability; and the more close the connections between individuals, the more certain and rapid the means of communication, the greater the necessity for removing class differences and including all under an absolutely common and

uniform law, whose prohibitions and restrictions bear upon all alike. Thus, for that security which it is the purpose of social liberty to guarantee, we cannot dispense with equality in rights. The human race cannot remain a part in ignorance and a part highly cultivated, a part sovereigns and the other part subjects, one portion with vested rights to rule and the other portion privileged only to obey. Make whatever barriers we please, knowledge will pass through them by osmosis, and with the permeating knowledge goes dynamitic force which will destroy thrones and abolish institutions which give to one man vested rights superior to his fellow, thereby unjustly restricting his opportunities for living out his life according to his own ideals of happiness and perfection.

CHAPTER VII.

EQUALITY IN POWER.

It would naturally occur to the reader of the last chapter to inquire how, granting the importance of equality in rights as a condition of social progress, such an equality can be secured. The thirst for domination is well-nigh universal, and it is not easily appeased. It grows by indulgence. If the law is to be equality, who can be trusted to enforce that law? This thought leads us to a further consideration of the topic of equal rights upon its opposite face.

The lust for power over one's fellows has been the greatest obstacle in the way of the progress of civilisation and of individual development. It has been not merely an open foe, but under multifarious disguises, so ingenious as to deceive the most intelligent, it has blighted social progress most seriously in all parts of the world. Of all the forms in which it has appeared, that of political authority has been the most fatal. This authority has fortified itself upon divine right and an alleged inherent sacredness of institutions as ends in themselves. In this way it has sought to justify itself, taking care, however, to remember that Providence is always on the side of the

heaviest battalions. It has likewise sometimes stood upon the claim of utility, though this has always been dangerous ground: but special exigencies have no doubt arisen when the value of the strong hand of a monarch has been so apparent as to reconcile the minds of people to a continuance of his power long after the necessity for it has passed away. There have been crises in the history of every state when it has been necessary to allow the governing authority a more absolute power and even to permit somewhat arbitrary action. The dictator is sometimes a useful and even indispensable functionary. The difficulty has been that the imperator once established will not relinquish his supremacy and dignity, and the people who have elevated and supported him do not appreciate that the value to the state of his office is only temporary; that when the emergency no longer exists his remaining in authority is increasingly detrimental. Military chieftainship seems essential to national defence, and the glory of military success turns the head of both leader and people. Under such circumstances, when the army has the power, it is no wonder that the political authority which it defends should perpetuate itself. In this tendency toward the perpetuation of authority lies the root of the evil.

To any one who considers the eagerness for domination which is so salient a trait in human character, it is obvious that power, wherever it exists, must be balanced or equality of rights will not even be left as a name to conjure by. If there are to be actually equal rights for all, settled inequality of power must be prevented. Thus any permanence of political

authority in one man or a class of men must be dangerous. The consul for ten years becomes consul for life, then emperor and absolute autocrat. Whenever office is created, there must be a responsibility to some one for the discharge of its duties with a power of censure and removal in case of abuse. There can be no government without entrusting authority to some men over others ; but the conditions of its exercise can be regulated and its duration limited so far as any one individual is concerned. Hence any claim of right to rule or to occupy official position, which is based upon inheritance, rank, caste, or divine delegation, must be condemned as in its very essence anti-social, and wherever it exists should be denied and opposed in every effective way.

No doubt kings are often held responsible to their people for their acts. In a constitutional monarchy especially, the sovereign's acts are circumscribed and controlled by laws, which, if disregarded, would be enforced against him, perhaps to the extent of depriving him of his throne. Practically the sovereign in such case is only an hereditary executive of laws which are supported by the people, and which will be upheld even to overruling the king's fiat. But the foundation principle under which he claims and is allowed to claim authority is wrong. Under other circumstances and with a different people the constitutional monarch becomes the dictator, in whom is the sole law and from whom proceeds all rightful authority. Political power exercised as a vested right is altogether dangerous to the security of individual rights and to social liberty.

Therefore, although power thus exercised may in fact be so balanced by acknowledged responsibility to law as to be comparatively harmless, complete safety can only be found in the recognition of the principle that political power is but a delegation, a permission; or better, a trust, bestowed upon individuals solely for the interests of the general freedom. Then the ruler is not a sovereign but a public servant, and can be held more strictly accountable for his deeds and misdeeds. Breach of public trust, then, is a crime to be punished with more severity than abuse of private trust; and he who obtains office is made to feel that his tenure depends upon his fidelity to the duties imposed upon him. And a most necessary precaution to be taken in the case of executive positions is to have that tenure limited with ineligibility of re-appointment or re-election. There are, to be sure, many official places in which long continuance is a great aid to efficiency in the discharge of duties, and connected with which there is no alarming amount of power. In such cases a different rule may be allowed to prevail; but in all offices to which is attached a high and broad executive authority especially controlling or affecting large numbers of people, the general interest cannot afford to take the risks of permitting the incumbents to remain for a long period when the temptation is all the time to work for the strengthening and perpetuation of their own supremacy. When, as in the army, the highest degree of efficiency cannot be secured if generals of proved ability be retired because of a fear of their influence upon others to promote selfish ends, some other

counteractive may be discovered. If military officers be made always ineligible to civil offices, and if the military service be invariably subordinated to the civil authority, all danger from the sources I have mentioned would probably be averted. But as a rule the sense of responsibility is heightened by the knowledge that there is a definite period when the authority taken up must be laid down and an account of stewardship rendered.

One of the most valuable supports of political autocracy and oligarchy has been found in the subtle but potent influence of the sentiment that political institutions are ends in themselves, not agencies ; that they have an inherent sacredness, and that they live, and are for ever destined to live, as far above individuals, and should dominate the latter by virtue of their intrinsic superiority. In another work¹ I have endeavoured to show that the doctrine in question is based upon fallacious principles, is really an outgrowth of the most incorrigible and reprehensible selfishness, and has been in the world's history one of the most prominent and serious obstacles in the way of the elimination of evil in human life. Having in that treatise discussed the topic at length, I shall do nothing more now than to reaffirm the conclusions there reached, that the state is nothing apart from the individuals composing it ; that legislation for the state itself, aside from those individuals, is not only futile, but delusive and dangerous to the peace and order of the community ; that the government is merely the agent of the people in carrying out such

¹ *The Problem of Evil.* Longmans, 1886.

measures of organisation and administration as are necessary for the common weal; and that all state and governmental authority exists solely and exclusively for the end of the highest happiness of the greater number of *individuals*. Beyond this there is no warrant whatever for the exercise of authority, and for adherence to this canon all governmental administration should at all times be held strictly accountable as a trustee to individual *cestuis que trust*.¹

We are now brought naturally to a consideration of the second form in which the desire for power has manifested itself to the detriment of the social weal. I refer to ecclesiastical authority. This has always shown a tendency to pass into political authority or to ally itself with the other, and in this its mischievous influence has been principally felt. By associating political power as exercised by certain men with the commands of the Almighty, making opposition to the governmental order, flagrant impiety, entailing upon the audacious culprit eternal damnation, a tremendous force has often been evoked in aid of absolutism. Of the practical influence of such claims of divine supervision, evidence enough exists in the fact that chieftains like Moses and Mohammed have been able to maintain an almost absolute governorship under the guise of a theocracy. Hence all the objections which occur against the continuance of vested political superiority obtain also against permanent ecclesiastical authority, so far as it has political relations.

It cannot be gainsaid that ecclesiasticism, wherever it has had actual power, has been in fact, and generally

¹ *The Problem of Evil*, chap. xviii.

in assertion, inimical to equality of rights. It could scarcely be otherwise, for its whole system is hierarchical. The relations held to exist between God and man are those between an absolute monarch and his subjects. The summit of piety is unqualified obedience. The model of a future state, toward which all men look with longing and with fear, is monarchical or oligarchical. The rewards promised to those who are pre-eminent in the religious virtues are superior rank and position with greater favour from the Deity. Hence earthly societies formed in similar fashion appear the most reasonable and the most admirable. And if people can be made to believe that those occupying high political or ecclesiastical positions are really God's lieutenants upon earth, doctrines favouring equal rights will necessarily be reprobated.

A further harm coming from ecclesiastical authority is its influence upon opinion and belief generally, and thus indirectly upon conduct. The acceptance of assertions upon the authority of some man or some organisation supposed to be a repository of infallible truth is terribly demoralising. It leads to the habit of relying on authority for knowledge, tends to quench the enthusiasm for truth, and to abate that questioning spirit which inspires all the mental activities that make for the acquisition and retention of the true, the beautiful, and the good. It produces mental apathy and makes ignorance seem a virtue. It is inimical to liberty and social order. As against such influences, the counter-force of enlightenment and education must be raised. Since we shall recur to this subject,

no more need be said at present than to call attention to it.

The principle of equality in respect to the right to wield political power and also in respect to the weight of opinions held, in the one case permitting no man long to bear sway over masses of his fellows, and in the other allowing to no one's declarations a greater consideration by reason of any office he may hold either in church or state, has been steadily making progress throughout the world. It has so far succeeded in pervading those communities which lead the van in material and social civilisation that its complete triumph may confidently be expected. But even with the admission of equality in rights as sound doctrine, to be practically applied in maintaining a governmental system and with a total absence of military autocracy, a formidable difficulty in the way of securing equal rights in fact has presented itself to human experience. This trouble, like every other affecting the matter, is still the persistence of an inequality of power ; tending, as such inequality always does, to encroachments on the part of the stronger. It is felt as an impending danger to social liberty even in the United States of America, where equality of political rights is one of the foundation-principles of the government. It is appreciated likewise in other countries where the militant spirit is yielding to the industrial. It is, in fact, a concomitant of industrial civilisation. I allude to the aristocracy of wealth.

It has been supposed by the most of political thinkers who are at the same time genuine philan-

thropists that under a *régime* where all men are equal before the law, where every citizen is eligible and may aspire to the highest governmental offices, and where every one may actually take part in the government by means of the ballot, a condition of absolute security would be found with the most complete liberty. Such has not proved to be the case. Inequality of power has, spite of all this, again become a menace to equal rights and once more infringes upon liberty. But the circumstances under which such a situation has been developed are so peculiar that it exhibits a problem exceedingly perplexing and difficult of satisfactory solution.

If the theory of human relations in a community be that each member is entitled to pursue his happiness in his own way unhindered by others, the right to hold and to acquire property cannot be denied him. He must have the right to work; and the products of his toil and his skill must be secured to him. Interference with such right is apparently an attack upon individual liberty, which, if permitted to prevail, would destroy freedom altogether. The right of property is a fundamental right, essentially appertaining to liberty and necessary to the normal development of life itself. If there be anything which ought to be sedulously guarded it is this same right.

When now in the peaceful pursuit of industrial occupation by legitimate business methods, by gift or inheritance, without force or fraud, a man comes to accumulate a great fortune, what objection can be raised? What he has achieved he has gained by

activities, for the free exercise of which men have been struggling for centuries. Having secured liberty, is it worth the price of all the blood and tears, if we cannot enjoy its blessings?

This is a plausible contention, but a little analysis will show that there is something more to be said which will put another face upon the matter. It is no less an essential part of social liberty that individual freedom shall be limited by the necessities of the common freedom than that the individual shall be free at all. He only secures his liberty by the restriction that no one shall use his liberty to another's hurt. Therefore the question is not over the right of restriction or limitation of action, but whether or not such restraint or inhibition is necessary to the common liberty. Hence, if any person so employs his activities or the products of them that another is cut off from equal opportunities to pursue his ends of life, there is certainly an ethical ground for the interposition of restraining law. And this ground exists as certainly when the same result is produced by inaction and a tenacious, though passive, holding of one's position.

The possession of great wealth has already wrought much evil in the directions indicated, and threatens to inflict more. Extensive landed proprietorship has unquestionably prevented great numbers of men from rising to a condition of independence, and has even reduced them to the position of dependents and slaves. In similar manner accumulations of personal property have resulted in the establishment of monopolies which have crushed out competition

and have put chains or clogs upon the activities of multitudes in less fortunate circumstances. The lords of the soil and of the counting-room have not hesitated to use their power even for political ends, and to affect in their favour the administration of government in all its branches. Because of these things equality of rights has sometimes seemed to be but a mocking name, serving only to remind people of what they had lost, as was said of the French with respect to their cherishing the term Liberty.

If having great possessions resulted merely in an enlargement of facilities for sumptuary enjoyment to which their owner would alone devote himself, there would be less harm; for no man, let him do his best, can spend his money without contributing to the advantage of somebody else. Fine houses and their accompaniments, works of art, libraries, banquets, music, and the countless articles of luxury in which the rich man may indulge his tastes, cannot be enjoyed without benefiting the producer and the purveyor. In similar manner, works of business enterprise like the building of railroads and steamboats, the establishment of valuable manufactures, and the encouragement of all sorts of industries, furnish employment to armies of men and stimulate general prosperity. If this were all, there would be no cause for complaint, and plutocracy would be an unqualified blessing. But the possession of the power conferred by riches, like all other power, almost irresistibly leads to unjust aggression, to the reduction of inferiors to subjection, to the prevention of other men from rising to an equality with the industrial lord. Political equality

no doubt furnishes a decided check to such tendencies, but unfortunately wealth has power to corrupt and to control so thoroughly as to render this protection of little avail.

It is such facts as those instanced in the last paragraph that make the problem a troublesome one; I mean the undeniable utilities of concentrated wealth. We are not only indebted to our moneyed kings for works of commercial importance, but also for splendid charities; for eleemosynary and educational institutions founded and supported by them, and of so great value to individuals, to the community, to the world, that their beneficent munificence in these respects seems to supply a complete atonement for their misdeeds, if they have any, and to present a sufficient offset to the disadvantages to which allusion has just been made. Yet it must not be forgotten that largesse, however generous and abundant, never can compensate for loss of liberty, and that established superiority of power in one necessarily is a loss of liberty to others. If opportunities are cut off, if the paths of advancement are blocked, if effort put forth in legitimate directions is turned back upon itself because of a *vis major* of wealth, the founding of colleges and asylums is not a *quid pro quo*.

There is no doubt that inequality of power from wealth is dangerous to social liberty, but I do not regard it as being so perilous as is political inequality. Nor do I believe that when the latter has been abolished and equality of political rights once established, it would be very easy for plutocratic

power to completely destroy this equality or to prevent its restoration after a season, even if temporarily impaired. There are a good many natural counteractives at work which effect a balance of power. These operate upon the volitions and actions of the millionaire and upon all whom he influences. They also raise antagonisms beyond the sphere of his power. In the first place, the rich man knows that riches have wings. Having great possessions, which must be in a measure entrusted to other men in the process of investment, he is not apt to be reckless or very aggressive. The military chief thrives on war; the industrial chief only in peace. The wealthy man is hence conservative, and no other can have a greater interest in preserving social order. Hence, though he may seek to extend and consolidate his power to a certain limit, his own intelligence will generally set such a limit; and he will see that his position cannot be secure if too great distress exists among his neighbours, or if their activities are too much circumscribed. If he had a military force at his command, his situation would be very different; then he could laugh at his inferiors: but without this, he cannot afford to provoke to physical violence or even to such an implacable hostility as to bring upon him social detestation. If he does, his financial ruin is very likely to ensue and his power is gone.

Thus the man who is rich in personal property, at least, is singularly dependent upon his fellows. To be of any use to him, his money must be in motion; and even if he were to buy bullion and lock it up, somebody must be trusted to keep it. If it is invested,

many people have the handling of it. He is thus under bonds for his good behaviour. With the landed proprietor, however, the case is somewhat altered. If his title is upheld by law, he can leave his land to take care of itself, sure that it will not vanish. All he need to concern himself about is to keep other men off it. Yet, if he wishes to make his property yield anything he must employ the services of his kind. But his title gives him always a signal advantage, and he can work more injury to others with less risk to himself than the holder of personal estate.

Again, man's life is short. From the twenty-first to the seventieth, or at most the eightieth year is the period of ownership. After sixty years of possession at the utmost there is a change; and if the man accumulates his property mainly by his own efforts, the duration of his power is much shorter, inasmuch as he usually does not acquire it till late in life. If the property all descend to one heir, the change of personality is of vast moment. The son is never the same as the father. His habits, his character, his aims, his ideals, his capacity, his friends, his associations—all are different. The solidarity of power is broken; there is at any rate a deflection and a loss of force difficult to recover; generally there is much more than this. The dispersion of power is of course accomplished in a still higher degree when the estate is divided among several heirs. In that case the disintegration is very thorough, for instead of one centre there are two, three, five, or more; there is dissipation in place of concentration.

Passing from the plutocrat to his environment, it

is evident that those through whom he utilises his money to his own enjoyment, though strongly bound to him, know that after all they are to a large extent his masters. They are held by their own interest, and, if he is not liberal, they can injure him in a thousand ways. They can neglect his work and do it ill. They can harm him secretly, if not openly, as regards his reputation in the community. While on his part there is fear, on their part there is knowledge of what they can do.

Once more, the rich man always has his rivals. It is impossible for one person to absorb all the wealth, and there are others who are in a nearly equal position. Jealous of his influence and standing, they watch him. They thwart him at every turn; they alienate his servants and retainers, they defeat his political ambitions and perpetually interfere with his designs.

Finally, changes of values, produced by causes beyond the control of any one individual, frequently occur and are always likely to occur; whereby great wealth is at once swept away or very considerably diminished. The millionaire may not become a beggar, but he is shorn of his strength and sinks to the common level.

Thus, without further illustration, it will be evident that the inequality of wealth is not likely of itself to create that permanently unbalanced power which is subversive of liberty. But we must not overlook the fact that against these counteractives there are strong reactionary forces in operation. Among them is the effect of laws of entail and

primogeniture. These are utterly obnoxious to equal rights and incompatible with any governmental *régime* established thereon. Their influence in derogation of the common liberty is patent, and wherever they exist lovers of liberty and of a good social order ought never to rest till their repeal has been secured. Where such legal devices do not obtain, equalisation of conditions is obstructed the most seriously by the power of combinations of one sort or another. Doubtless the most conspicuous of these is the corporation, in which a vast amount of power can be concentrated with comparatively little individual responsibility. The evils attendant upon this form of co-operation and also such organisations as labour unions, together with some correctives, I have pointed out in the work to which reference has already been made.¹ There, likewise, the dangers of too great a devotion to party and faction have been indicated. At present, consequently, we have need only to refer to such perils as instances of the general insecurity wherever there is inequality of power, to illustrate and emphasise the truth that under conditions of such inequality the maintenance of equality of rights cannot be assured. The same thing is true when the excess of power arises from fame, reputation, glory. Too great admiration leads to blind worship, and the hero becomes the dictator. It is by no means an unfortunate situation for a country when it has no pre-eminently great men; and it is peculiarly deplorable when the destinies of a nation hang upon the life or the actions of any one individual. How-

¹ *The Problem of Evil*, ch. xxiii.

ever glorious may be his career, his supremacy is evidence of a very imperfect degree of civilisation, far below that which the social ideal holds up as the highest. Worse, it indicates a condition of insecurity, prophetic of serious convulsions as inevitable in order to restore the lost equilibrium. Such a restoration must somehow take place, for nature will unceasingly work for equalisation, and the making of laws or the establishment of sovereignties based on force cannot prevent it.

Therefore we must conclude that inequality of power, from whatsoever cause it may arise, is dangerous to security, and its growth should be carefully and jealously watched. It should be resisted and checked, and any alarming preponderance or concentration prevented, lest Might become the only law of Right.¹

¹ Since this Part was written, I have read *Civilisation and Progress*, by John Beattie Crosier (Longmans, 1888), a work in which I find much to commend. The principle of the 'Equalisation of Material and Social Conditions,' given by Mr. Crosier as the controlling factor in progress, is substantially the same as that set forth in the foregoing chapter, and is very strongly enforced by argument and illustration.

CHAPTER VIII.

FRATERNITY.

WHEN the French overthrew the Bourbon monarchy, in their search for political principles they adopted 'Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity,' as expressing the social ends to be attained under the new *régime*. What they really meant by the last of these terms is not easy to say. It may be doubted if they meant much of anything. It was enough that the word sounded well. So far as there was any meaning, probably it was substantially the same as that conveyed by Equality. All men should be regarded as brothers with equal rights and privileges.

But there is in 'Fraternity' an implication of obligation, which is of the utmost importance. If this be understood and be made of the essence of the term, the battle-cry of the French Republic well-nigh expresses completely the foundation-principles of social order. The maintenance of the state depends not alone on the preservation of rights, but also on developing the sense of obligation. This is a matter too little considered by statesmen.

If we legislate that all men shall have equal rights, we find the disagreeable fact that men will not grant them to each other. They will tyrannise and enslave

if they are able. And if we take legislative measures to prevent inequality of power, we find the enforcement of laws exceedingly troublesome because human agents must enforce them, and selfish purposes and ends are prone to overcome the social in all individuals. The only way to realise perfectly the ideal of the social organism is to create in men the disposition to regulate their own conduct by it, to prefer the good of the whole to their own selfish interest.

It is generally conceded by political thinkers and workers that moral sentiments (and, according to some, religious also) are the basis of social order. But they are not apt to devote very much thought or labour to the education of these sentiments as a matter of practical concern. They leave such things to the preachers and schoolmasters. They prefer to occupy themselves with questions of finance, of civil administration, military and naval defence, and industrial development. The time is coming, however, when it will be more generally acknowledged that political work depends upon educational work, and that questions of education, of intellect and character, are of the very first importance in every community.

This is already thoroughly appreciated by some statesmen, indeed, and by very many whose life-work is chiefly outside of the political sphere. Religious teachers understand it, and so do students and scholars generally. Educational movements go bravely on and the most encouraging results follow. Such being the case it is altogether unfortunate that those who labour in educational and philanthropic lines should be divided into two more or less hostile camps. The

scientists, so-called, are teachers ; and so are the religionists, so termed. Both recognise the paramount value of education in the highest sense, and over against them is the mass of the careless, the indifferent, the unenlightened, the brutish. It surely ought to be that a common ground for co-operative work can be reached which dispenses with antagonisms.

If it be true that so far as human relations are concerned the Golden Rule be, as that eminent theologian Dr. Julius Müller says, the *ἀνακεφαλαίωσις*, the sum and substance of divine commands to men, scientific ethics issue in precisely the same precept, and science and religion stand upon the same platform for practical work. Science, psychology, philosophy, teach that no fulness of human life, no maximum of happiness can be attained even for the individual save in the possession of such a disposition as finds its chief interest in the interests of others ; that without this last knowledge is vain or a power for evil. If, then, science and religion are agreed that the root of moral and social evil is the evil dispositions of men, if we would secure the predominance of the good, we have left for investigation only questions of method.

There are some who deny to Christianity any peculiar efficacy for transforming social evil into social good ; there are others who declare that Christianity furnishes the only power to improve men, and thus society. In my judgment we must effect a compromise by inducing the concession on the one side that Christianity does furnish an efficient influence to produce that soul cure which is necessary for the ideal social order,

and on the other that it is not the sole possessor of that cure or always the most trustworthy physician to administer it. By Christianity I mean organised Christianity. One difficulty in the minds of people in their reasonings and discussions is this latent ambiguity as to the meaning of the term Christianity, to which we shall again refer, and to which I now call attention for the purpose of indicating the sense in which I say that Christianity cannot invariably be trusted to use its own remedies. It is perpetually mistaking its own medicines and employing them empirically. When it makes a wonderful cure, it fails to understand what is the curative principle in its own treatment. Therefore I urge upon the clergy to become scientists; morbid anatomists first, because it is necessary; vivisectors also, if it is requisite; and then scientific workers upon the living human being needing cure. They are feeling the necessity of this, it is interesting to observe, and are rapidly becoming educated. It is to be hoped they will become still better educated, as well for their own sake as for that of their constituencies.

The whole question is suggested in an expression of Vinet. He says: 'It is the glory of the gospels, not that they furnish to us a new morality, but that they give us a power to practise the old.' Morality did not originate with Jesus of Nazareth. Society existed long before his time, and society implies some degree of moral conduct. The Golden Rule is found in Book II. of the 'Leges' of Plato, to say nothing of earlier records of the same sentiment. But is there or is there not a power in Christianity to develop a

moral disposition and to vitalise one that has become deadened ?

It cannot reasonably be doubted that there is such a power which is evidenced in the history of the Christian religion from its first establishment down to the present time. But it must also be allowed that there does exist morality and the disposition to love one's neighbour as one's self entirely apart from any allegiance to Christ or to organised Christianity. It exists in Christian countries in self-denying men and women who reject the claims of the Christian religion, even in noted and aggressive opponents. It is also discoverable among those who, before Christ and since, are believers in other religions, and it even occurs among those who never heard of the Nazarene. Again, it must be conceded that where the authority of the Messiah is acknowledged the evil disposition does not disappear, nor with it social immorality ; unless, indeed, it be urged, as it sometimes is, that he who embraces Christianity and is born again has no longer any evil will and character, whatever he may do. Certainly all kinds of the worst crimes and immoralities have been committed not alone by Christians, but in the name of Christianity. The conclusion to which we are forced is, therefore, that whatever may be the superiority of Christianity, on the whole, for curing the soul, and whatever may be its relations to the salvation of the soul in another world, it is not as an organised and distinctive system omnipotent or exclusive in its favourable influences upon the moral disposition.

We are thus led on to the inquiry—Is there a

common source of power to develop moral character within and without the Christian religion? If so, what is it, and what are the relations of Christianity to it? To begin with, we must premise a natural germ of such character in men. The fact of the existence of such a thing as morality indicates a capacity of mankind to be moral. If by morality we mean that regard for the good of all which makes the social organism possible, that disposition and practice in which one finds his good in the welfare of his neighbour, and if man is so constituted that he can become moral in this sense, it cannot be said that morality is any less natural than non-morality or immorality. Whatever its development may be its germs lie in the natural constitution of man, as set forth in the preceding chapters (Chaps. II. and III.). Thus we find in human beings a tendency toward social ideals and toward selfish. Both of these are susceptible of growth and cultivation; both may be dwarfed and largely suppressed.

There must be some pleasure or well-being which accompanies the thought of doing a moral act to stimulate in the individual the volition to perform that act. He must experience some pleasurable feeling in connection with this idea. We then are obliged to ask whence comes, and how is developed, this pleasure which I experience in thinking of, and promoting the weal of others? Upon investigation we cannot fail to be led to the conclusion that the foundation for this is the selfish consideration of how delightful it would be if everybody else besides ourselves were animated by the desire and purpose of

helping instead of hurting his neighbour. I should in that case find a supporting, not an opposing force. Instead of being obliged to be constantly on guard against attack, instead of competition and conflict, I should everywhere find assistance, co-operation and peace. All my activities could be put forth without fear, and all my hopes and aspirations realised. Thus out of the toil and trouble, the strife and destruction in the world as it is, rises the ideal of a state of society wherein there is harmony and happiness. The presence of such an ideal as possible to be realised, together with the dissatisfaction with existing conditions, inevitably creates and fosters an impulse to promote such a state. On reflection we at once discover that this is only feasible of achievement through the self-restraint and self-denial of each individual, ourselves included. If we wish others to be altruistic, we ourselves must conquer our selfishness. Thus begins a strife within to overcome our self-will, our egoistic purposes, and to learn to take our pleasure in the pleasure of others, to find our good in the welfare of the community. What we want primarily is an envioning condition of freedom for the exercise of our activities ; but this we can only obtain through self-control and self-abnegation.

The hopelessness of seeing realised in the life of any of us our ideals of a perfect society impresses itself upon all, and necessarily operates to quench the enthusiasm we may develop for the altruistic life. Whatever I may be and do, it is useless for me to expect to reform society, and at best my efforts would make scarcely an appreciable impression upon the

world. It will be better for me, I reason, to content myself with enjoying the present, since otherwise I should only make trouble for myself, and so far as I can calculate, uselessly. Such thoughts weaken the force of volitions which the ideal we have been speaking of tends to create. Besides, the ordinary selfish appetites are strong and frequently come into opposition with the altruistic demands. Thus there arises a tendency to become apathetic over the matter of moral conduct. We know the right but do not follow it; we see the wrong and yet pursue it. This lapse may continue, unless counteracted, until society is disorganised. We in our generation may be only mildly selfish; we may commit no crimes; but we shall be less careful about the moral tone of the community, less anxious to repress those who are actively malicious, and less solicitous about the proper training of the rising generation. The latter will reap the fruit of our neglect. After Louis XIV. and Louis XV. came the outbreak which cost Louis XVI. his head.

If now in this condition of despair over the practicability of realising an ideal state of society, there is induced the hope and promise of a life beyond the grave, wherein the rough places shall be made smooth and the crooked paths straight, and in which all desires shall be fulfilled, there is given a decided impulse to our dispositions to do the best we may be able for moral and social order. The damper put on by our thought that efforts are almost useless since life is short, is quite removed. There is no limit to the possibility of achievement. And when a connec-

tion is established between our conduct in this life and our happiness in the world to come, an immense power to move the will and form dispositions is created. Having given a morality based upon the Golden Rule which we appreciate as most excellent in theory and highly desirable for the world here ; if we believe that our efforts to make such morality universal in human society will tend to secure our happiness hereafter, while a contrary course will have the opposite tendency, even though we suffer for what we do, the hope of future reward will be compensation for present ills.

He from the dreadful gates of death
Doth his own children raise ;
In Zion's gates with cheerful breath
They sing their Father's praise.

We have now found, as I conceive, the nature of that power to practise morality which Vinet declared to be the glory of the gospels. But we see that its effect depends upon natural sentiments of the human mind, which can be aroused not only by the gospels of Christianity but by any religion which establishes a connection between the present and a future life. All religions do this, unless, perhaps, the Religion of Humanity ; they all have their heaven and make good conduct in this life the qualification for entering the door of Paradise. They differ, indeed, as to what is good conduct, but whatever they hold it to be, the one who practises it is sure of blessed immortality. But the superiority of Christianity in its influences on society lies in the fact that it has adopted as the ideal of the perfect life for the individual the social ideal.

It has said to each man, You shall be clothed on with immortality, and great shall be your reward if you fulfil the law ; the law is, Love and obey God and love man. Between these two members of the command, however, has unhappily arisen an opposition which has greatly impaired the full effect of altruistic influence contained in Christianity. It is substantially the opposition between Old Testament morality and New. One teaches unquestioning and unreasoning obedience, the other explains that the fulfilling of the law is complete in love.

The great obstruction to the development of the altruistic character in the world has been in multifarious forms the notion of authority, as intrinsically just, the idea that one man has righteously power over another, is better than another, is entitled by virtue of position, birth, strength, or divine delegation to command his fellows, use them for his ends, irrespective of their own preferences. This has pervaded state and church. It has formed monarchical, imperial systems of government in both. It has justified and perpetuated war and robbery. It gives scope for the unrestrained growth of selfish dispositions and character. These statements have been made before in this work, but I desire to make a special application of them in calling attention to the fact that the altruistic character, the morally healthy soul, must have its vital principle within, which can be preserved only by autonomy. The desire to live for the welfare of others can alone be maintained under a self-formed ideal which grows and blossoms as the plant under the sunlight. It cannot be forced upon one by edicts

or decrees ; nor can it ever develop under the influence of fear. The thorough student of mental science must see that this is psychologically true. Action always produces reaction ; and antagonism once generated, the assimilative process between two natures ceases. Each gathers together more compactly its own and repels more strongly everything extrinsic and foreign. The other ceases to be the neighbour and becomes a barbarian. War and mutual destruction are ready to follow, and society perishes till the storm has passed and there is again opportunity for a new organic growth.

In the light of these considerations, I urge upon all physicians of men's souls the necessity of cherishing, both in state and church, principles uncompromisingly democratic. If I were to say that the ideal of a perfect society is anarchy, I should no doubt startle and shock the reader. It would be, indeed, curious to set forth as such an ideal, a society without organised government, in which all are equally sovereigns, which is without written law, without police, without tribunals, without a legislature, a judiciary or an executive, in which each man's will is law. And yet it seems to me, I behold very much such a community when I read of a City which is even without temples, and which, though without the light of the sun or the moon, has yet no night, and into which is brought the glory and honour of the nations, and wherein each of the inhabitants *reigns* for ever and ever. Such a community requires the perfection of the altruistic character ; and the fact that such perfection necessitates the abolition of what we ordinarily term government ought to bring before

us prominently the truth that, for the sake of promoting such a character, we must labour concurrently at diminishing the constraints of outward authority. While we seek to develop everywhere and in all, the disposition of love; a precept truly complementary, an opposite face to the principle of altruism, is to aim always in government, in social relations, in education at the minimum of restraint and the maximum of liberty for the individual.


I am quite aware that this doctrine is a two-edged sword and must be handled carefully. We should never lose sight of the fact that as human nature is constituted too absolute a removal of restraint is followed by selfish assertion and conflict of wills; that then anarchy means chaos and leads with certainty to a despotism. This is where the professional anarchist of our own times makes his mistake. The condition which he seeks to bring about is fatal to liberty. Under absolutism revolution may be the only means of social regeneration, but in a democracy revolutionary attacks upon the constituted authority are without the shadow of justification or excuse, and must be repressed for liberty's sake. Yet, taking the civilised world as a whole, it seems clear that the greatest obstacles in the way of realising the ideal of human virtue still lie in the restraints of authority. The Russian autocracy with its repression of education, its present degradation, its corrupt bureaucracy, is a fearful menace to civilisation. The German imperial system, sacrificing a cultivated and intelligent people to the brutal domination of a state doctrine false in principle and blighting in its results.

is saddening and revolting to the lover of man's weal. The English, even, fail to understand that their sentiment of loyalty to a sovereign and an aristocracy, beautiful as it may sometimes appear, makes them for ever to grind ruthlessly the face of the poor. And in America too there is much to be thought of. The idea is often put forth that we ought to have more veneration for institutions; that the government is not the agent of the community, but still is sovereign; that this or that office, this law, that principle has an 'inherent sacredness,' exempting it from criticism. And to my mind there is just now much cause for regret also at the socialistic trend of political thought. The *laissez-faire* doctrine, once so popular, is becoming outlawed, and few are found so poor as to do it reverence. No doubt in the greater complexity of social life there are more requirements which may properly be made of a government, but the idea that its essential function is to guarantee security to all in the exercise of liberty must not be lost sight of, or we shall discover sooner or later to our cost that there are more evils than benefits which spring from any attempt to use the power of the state to force development, to attain conspicuous results, to achieve national renown, military or industrial. Such a course will end in the domination of one man or of one class over another; it will impair the ideal of human equality and human brotherhood. The poet prays that 'more of reverence in us dwell.' Yes! But reverence for what? Surely not reverence for abstractions under which despotism has always prospered. The state in itself is nothing; institutions,

organisations intrinsically are nothing; they are entitled to no respect save as they subserve a useful purpose, and when they have ceased to serve such a purpose the iconoclast must be summoned and they must yield place to something better. Men are everything; their personalities, their individualities, their happiness. When I read the works of the socialistic Germans, Lasalle and Marx, their followers and descendants in Europe and America, I turn with great relief and with a far deeper conviction of truth to the language of that profounder German, Wilhelm von Humboldt: 'Wherefore it follows that men are not to unite themselves together in order to forego any portion of their individuality, but only to lessen the exclusiveness of their isolation; it is not the object of such a union to transform one being into another, but to open out approaches between the single natures; whatever each himself possesses he is to compare with that which he receives by communication with others; and, while introducing modifications in his own being by the comparison, not to allow its force and peculiarity to be suppressed in the process. . . . The principle of the true art of social intercourse consists in a ceaseless endeavour to grasp the innermost individuality of another, to avail one's self of it, and, penetrated with the deepest respect for it as the individuality of another—to act upon it—a kind of action in which that same respect will not allow us other means for this purpose than to manifest one's self and to institute a comparison, as it were, between the two natures before the eyes of the other.'

Passing now to the church, we shall find, if we examine closely, that the value of Christianity, to say nothing of other religions, has varied as the life or the organisation has been held to be of paramount importance. I made allusion to an ambiguity in the term *Christianity*; and this ambiguity has arisen from two different conceptions of the Christian religion. One is, that adherence to the visible organisation with Christ as hierarch is essential, the other that the life exemplified by Christ is alone crucial. The former idea develops the doctrines of authority; the latter, those of individualism. As I interpret history, Christianity has been a power for woe or for weal largely as it has been dominated by the one or the other of these conceptions. And at the present day, though in modified forms, these two views of the essential meaning of Christianity antagonise each other. If it were possible for Christian teachers to hold that the altruistic character is the Christian character, quite irrespective of intellectual beliefs, it would be a great gain for humanity. Perhaps it might be thought that this would be a surrender of some of the distinctive principles of Christianity. And yet we find St. Augustine saying: 'Christianity has existed since time or the world began; Christ coming gave to the principles he advocated the name it now bears.' However, I will not go into this discussion further than to suggest that a great many who are willing to labour for the service of humanity are kept from working with church societies by the requirements of subscription to and profession of a creed which they do not and cannot believe. It

would seem that the preservation of doctrine esteemed to be sound might be effected by the adoption of a creed as a platform without requiring individual subscriptions to it, the condition of fellowship being Christian conduct according to the Law of Love. It would be largely to the interest of the church to allow this, for educational purposes: since if only men can be persuaded to join in the *work*, knowledge of the doctrine is promised. I am persuaded that the sole basis of union between Christians and non-Christians in the practical task of curing the soul lies in a common recognition, as the supreme test of virtue, of the disposition to find one's happiness in the welfare of others, and that the securing of this disposition is the common and transcendent end of effort. We cannot, indeed, disguise from ourselves that, so far as the relations of men to Jesus Christ are concerned, we have to deal primarily with questions of fact, on which there is no room for compromise. We either believe or we do not believe. But if work in this world is to accomplish the perfection of humanity in the Christ-like character, which at least so far as relations to man are concerned is the altruistic, antagonism in these beliefs ought not on either side to prevent full recognition of the results attained and full credit to the sources thereof, Christian or other.



PART II.

THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL PROGRESS.



CHAPTER IX.

RADICALISM AND CONSERVATISM.

OUR study of the Conditions of Social Progress has made it evident, I trust, that for the success of progressive movements there must be a background of permanence, a stability of structure to furnish a basis for change and with reference to which changes take place. There must be preserved a social equilibrium through the counteraction of restraining forces represented by law and those promotive of growth through the spontaneous activity of individuals, for which liberty must be afforded. In every community there are observable two opposed tendencies with regard to the existing order of things; one toward change, the other, resistance to change. The terms *Radicalism* and *Conservatism* have been used to express these antagonistic forces.

With that abominable perversity of the human mind which leads so frequently to the inclusion under a common name of things essentially different, and then to the praising or condemnation of them because they happen to have become thus labelled, men have, according to their predilections, enthusiastically supported here radicalism, there conservatism, without much knowledge of the meaning of either, and certainly without taking pains to find out if the terms

in any particular case are correctly applied. If a person or a measure be dubbed *radical*, it is quite enough with the man of conservative proclivities to create a prejudice; while his neighbour who prides himself on his radicalism very likely finds his dislike aroused by anything which a 'conservative' is willing to favour. When bloody wars have been waged without the combatants being able to ascertain or even willing to inquire what they are fighting about, it is not surprising that in peaceful political and social movements parties should be created to engage in controversies with each other, without any clear definition of principles and without any certainty of their accurate application. No doubt a political party might be formed of those who wear low hats and one of those who wear high hats; this one might call itself radical, the other conservative; they might cordially hate each other; but it would by no means follow that the names appropriated meant anything. They would signify just as much as and no more than the low or high hat. They would be a badge of membership in a fraternity or society. In such case it happens that the organisation becomes first, last and everything. Principles are of no more importance than names; they are simply catch-phrases or rallying cries, which might be replaced by any others, were it not for the power of usage and habit. Indeed, there are numerous instances of parties formed and held together in just this way. They may or may not have started with some object suggested by a principle; however that may be, it is evident finally that the party as a society of men is

the chief end. When such is the condition, it becomes even contrary to the morals of the fraternity to talk about principles, for the effect would be disintegrating ; while everything that looks toward approval of an opposed party or to establishing points of community between the two must be reprobated as destructive of solidarity.

In this manner, though without definite organisation, antithetical sentiments of radicalism and conservatism grow up in a community, and people are trusted or distrusted according as they have a reputation for the one or the other. Measures, too, are vehemently urged merely because they will do away with a present condition deemed uncomfortable ; and on the other hand suggestions are bitterly opposed because they are novel. The mere fact that they are 'progressive' assures the favour of people of a certain disposition, without any inquiry as to the direction or extent of the progress. With others a novelty is necessarily 'radical,' and if radical, alarming and dangerous. Thus arises an unreasoning sentiment, thoroughly unreasonable also, which makes the radical an agitator, the conservative an obstructionist, and creates two parties which antagonise each other in a partisan spirit in much the same way as if they rallied to martial music, had a flag and a uniform and the names of their adherents on a roster.

It is very unfortunate that such sentiments exist ; for it must be conceded by every one on reflection that the thing to be determined when a change is proposed is, after all, whether or not a benefit will issue ; whether or not the new is an improvement upon the

old. The investigation, indeed, should take a wide range, but it should have the object just stated ; and approval or disapproval should depend solely on the results of such an examination. The government of the feelings is a hard matter. Prejudices, sympathies, antipathies rule most men's minds. Still, after all, man is a rational animal : and it is surely worth while to make the attempt to overcome bias and to rule conduct by reason.

The Promotion of Social Progress, considered in its general aspects, resolves itself, therefore, as a topic into questions of the mutual relations of those dynamic and static forces which are expressed by the terms Radicalism and Conservatism. Both of them are factors of that progress. So far as this work is concerned I shall regard the former as the spirit of or tendency toward change in human societies ; the latter as marking the disposition to conserve or preserve things as they are, under the assumption in both cases of a supposed greater benefit to the social organism from the course actually followed. Our task in this Part is, then, to determine as far as may be the principles which should guide us in estimating the value of proposed changes in an existing social order, and to make a few applications of those principles.

CHAPTER X.

THE UTILITY OF CHANGE.

IN Chapter II. we noted that Liberty is resolvable into Freedom of Movement. Social change involves movement on the part of individuals who are component parts of the social organism. This movement is first a movement of thought ; it then may proceed to expression in language and to action in many ways. The immediate cause is pain in some of its forms, from a felt uneasiness to acute distress. The movement itself is toward relief in the directions which, when followed, experience has indicated to be productive of such relief. Thus social change always arises from the dissatisfaction of individuals with existing conditions, prompting them to such action as will relieve their discontent and satisfy, as they believe, their ideals of a better state of things. The fact that the desires and interests of individuals collide, one man's pain often contributing to another's joy, necessitates some principle of accommodation, which we found in the doctrine of the common liberty as superior to the individual will.

This, however, is a negative principle. The course of our inquiry in the preceding Part led us to the conclusion that a merely negative rule of action was not sufficient. We saw that, to have order there

must be a disposition on the part of individuals to have it. The state cannot prosper without virtuous citizens. The characters of men must be improved. Such a virtuous disposition is the altruistic, wherein one comes to find his happiness in the happiness of others. The common interest must be each one's chief interest: the good of the whole his chief good. Restraint by force must, indeed, be employed where this disposition does not exist; but the true statesman will always aim to secure that which dispenses with the necessity of coercive measures.

The altruistic rule leads to a criterion of the value of social changes. This standard is that of general social utility, or, in familiar words, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. On the negative side, the common liberty must be preserved; and on the positive, effort must be directed and governed by the maximum-happiness canon. There is room, of course, for much discussion over this doctrine: but I hope I have elsewhere examined into the foundations of ethics and politics sufficiently to be permitted to omit such a discussion in this treatise without being charged with a failure to establish my premises by adequate proof.

If we declare that the supreme test of the utility of change is the greatest happiness of the greatest number we have not got very far. This might be conceded, and we should still discover that we had obtained little help toward finding the desired guides to conduct. Bacon very correctly insisted that the *axiomata media* are of chief practical importance. The higher generalisation, however, is not to be

despised, but it must be applied with care and definiteness in the formation of minor, more particular principles and precepts, else it may even be an obstruction in the way of gaining knowledge and securing good conduct. An ultimate rule we must have, however, a court of last resort, a final criterion; and such for us is the principle above enunciated.

It is obvious that change cannot in itself or always be condemned as deleterious : for change, as we saw, is a necessity of organic life. In the human body, for example, life is dependent upon the changes going on within and the process of adaptation to what is without. Human society being of an organic nature similar to that of the human individual, the acts of one affect others and produce a reaction. In greater or less degree there is a constant flux and variation of social phenomena. Individuals come and go, environments change, and there must be a continual readjustment to new conditions.

But change, as we also indicated, may be of an assimilative and integrative or of a disintegrative and destructive character. Reproductive change might be added to these, though really an extension of the first-named. The one kind is healthful and indicative of growth, improvement, strength; the other is symptomatic of disease and points toward decay and death. This is certainly true of organic life in general. It is also in a great measure true of that super-organic life which we term society, but some special distinctions ought here to be drawn. They are exemplified in the fact that the limits of what we call the social organism are so variable. There is an organic union

of the family, another of the town, another of the guild, another of the state, and even one of the nations. It is hence extremely difficult to tell oftentimes what change is really to be considered disintegrative on the whole and what is the reverse, for that which is destructive of the organism of the guild, for example, may be integrative of and beneficial to the organism of the state. Again, the destruction of a state has doubtless many times been an advantage to mankind as a whole. The question of the utility of change, therefore, is largely dependent upon the limits we assign to our regards.

In the present state of the world we can scarcely avoid taking into account the human race in every quarter of the globe. If we were disposed to do so, the demands of commerce and the facilities for communication are likely at any time to bring us into social relations with people who are geographically most remote from us. Unquestionably, in the future, bonds of union between nations widely separated will rapidly increase in complexity, in extent, and in strength. Hence, however clannish our sentiments may be; spite of ourselves we shall be obliged from the force of circumstances more and more to regard a man as a man wherever we find him, to legislate with reference to mankind as of one blood, and to moralise on the basis of the organic union of the whole human race. Not merely as a consistent theoretical principle but a growing practical necessity, must we consider social radicalism and conservatism in their bearing upon the welfare of men as men, not as Americans, or Englishmen, or Germans, or Chinese.

Our only rule must be to adopt as an ideal a society of the whole human race, whose members should be protected by the social law and should be held amenable to the social law.

Such a principle by no means tends to prevent the more intimate relationships of smaller aggregations of men. Neither family affection nor patriotic devotion to the state need be abolished by cherishing a social ideal such as I have been describing. The latter only requires the recognition of the truth that, under the altruistic precepts of conduct, human beings as such have rights which must be respected even against the requirement of special relationships. Because I love my brother, I have no right to despoil the stranger on the highway, nor even to leave him to starve. Because I am loyal to my country, I have no business to attack and kill the people of other countries under any such doctrine as 'Our country right or wrong.' Neither family ascendancy nor national predominance furnish the final end or aim for truly ethical conduct. These last should always be held subordinate to the welfare of mankind in general, and if for the sake of that welfare it is necessary that states perish, their destruction is progress not retrogression, integration not disintegration, evolution not dissolution.

Nevertheless, in most cases it is no doubt the fact that the utility of change is determined by its effects upon a comparatively limited environment, varying somewhat according to differences of conditions. All such changes as tend to make more secure personal rights to life and liberty, though aiming to benefit particular individuals or a particular class, are inherently

beneficial to the whole of mankind, because their influence is to create a respect for the fundamental rights of man as a human being, whatever his class or condition. In movements of this sort there is no necessity for considering those beyond the sphere of immediate effect, because in these things the people proximately affected are representatives of the race; and through them mankind in general is served. But it is of the utmost importance to educate minds to entertain and be governed by the larger ideal, in order that they may know when the requirements of the greater organic unity should be heeded, and when the present advantage of the comparatively few ought to yield to the supreme good, the welfare of all.

Since the individual is the unit of social life and the source of changes and impulses to change in the social condition, springing out of his wants; and since there is no way of absolutely determining what those wants may be, inasmuch as circumstances are changing and the course of evolution is continuous, the fact that a man wants new things affords some presumption that he should have them and opportunity should be left for the satisfaction of wants which may arise. For change may be useful because it is change. Within certain limits variety is the spice of life, and freedom for the exercise of spontaneous activity is highly valuable since it enables men to adapt themselves to their changing environments. If surrounding nature does not remain still, men cannot stay still. If the processes of organic life are all the while going on within the human body, the human mind will actively move in a parallel course. Whatever limits

may be necessary, therefore, they must not so constrain as to destroy the individual spontaneity in the free enjoyment of which consists all life that is worth living.

In view of the fact already stated that change is a necessity of organic life, we ought to emphasise the further fact that if integrative change is stopped disintegrative will begin. If evolution is suppressed dissolution will certainly follow. If nature cannot develop further an existing structure, she will pull it down in order that she may begin anew. The conservative, therefore, if he be true to his principles, should be exceedingly careful not to carry his opposition to changes to an extreme. For if he do, he will bring entire destruction instead of partial destruction and renovation. This has happened so often in the world's history that the wonder is why a stupidity which fails to understand this natural fact is so persistently recurrent. It is exemplified every day and is not creditable to human intelligence.

Our conclusions are, then, that the utility of change must be determined by the degree of its beneficial effects upon individuals; having in view always the maximum happiness of the greatest number, with an ideal of organic unity ever tending to the inclusion of the whole human race. We note also that some change is inevitable, and that entire repression of change will only result in producing disintegrative and destructive change; so that our efforts must be directed toward the guidance of the moving forces along the lines of natural evolution rather than wasted in attempts at absolute prevention.

CHAPTER XI.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

THE conclusion of the last chapter indicates the first general principle governing the whole subject; namely, that the social constitution must provide orderly methods for its own revision and for the initiation and accomplishment of changes. This has special application to the political sphere; for individuals, if not interfered with, will of their own spontaneity, propose and attempt to carry out changes. When properly interpreted, such a principle means simply that no repressive measures must be taken to prevent the origination, expression, and agitation of new ideas merely because they are opposed to an existing *régime*. In other words, the equality of rights must be conceded to all to move for change in such ways as shall be provided.

The next question is the limitation of the activity toward change. If individuals are to be free to desire and actively seek for new things, how shall their movements be regulated? If not restrained at all there is chaos; and if they are restrained, so far forth is there a repression of that spontaneous energy of their natures which is necessary for social liberty and prosperity. This at once brings us back to the fundamental social

principle enunciated in the first Part of our work, that the liberty of the one should only be interfered with for the sake of the common freedom. This last must take precedence if we are to have society at all; and the question of limitation, therefore, becomes one involving the determination of what is and what is not a violation of the common freedom.

Conservatism, generally speaking, must concern itself with the maintenance of the social equilibrium. But this is often already destroyed before radicalism begins its work. Merely because the plans of the agitator are revolutionary, he cannot be ethically and justifiably opposed. He may be the truest conservative, because he sees the present order to be unstable and that a common liberty which has been lost must be restored before there can be any hope of permanent peace and happiness.

The true test of the existence of this common freedom lies in the answer to the inquiry whether there exists in the community equality and security in the enjoyment of the fundamental rights of man. These are Life, Liberty, and Property. If every man is secure in his possession and use of these and in this security there is complete equality between all men, there is a perfect common freedom and thus the highest degree of individual freedom of which the social state will admit.

We may set forth, then, the following general principles :

1. Opportunity should always be afforded in a community for the free movement of evolutionary forces in producing change.
2. Changes tending to establish or to make more

secure the common freedom should be favoured ; those of a contrary tendency should be opposed.

3. The degree of equality and security in the enjoyment of the fundamental rights of Life, Liberty, and Property is the test for determining the existing degree of common freedom, by which to measure, in given cases, the value of radical and conservative movements, respectively.

In the light of these principles, when any change from existing institutions or customs is desired, we ought first to consider the interests of the proponents. The desire for change is not without causes. These may be selfish or they may be inspired by thoughts of the woe and weal of others. It does not follow because the motives are egoistic that the proposed change is to be condemned. We should, however, in such case be put upon our guard and scrutinise more carefully the innovation, with more anxiety to hear the other side, and with a greater readiness to start objections. On the other hand the fact that a suggested novelty proceeds from the highest and most philanthropic motives must not blind us to its defects and demerits as a practical measure. Lichtenberg observed, with great truth, that enthusiasts without capacity are the really dangerous people. Wild and impracticable reforms originating from praiseworthy motives are almost as harmful as opposition to good measures proceeding from avowed malignity. There must be a cool and judicial examination into the circumstances of each case before we can give an approval or venture our disapproval.

If there be a clear deprivation of natural rights,

any movement to gain these, whether egoistic in its inception or not, is *prima facie* to be supported, for the reasons already given. If life is endangered, if liberty is taken away without due process of law, or if the law which infringes liberty be wrong, if private property is violated, if injustice be anywhere perpetrated; then remedies for these ills ought to be provided, and the man who agitates for the securing of them should be regarded as a public benefactor doing his duty to society, whether his own sufferings inspired him to action or those of someone else. The restraint upon action in such case arises wholly from questions of expediency, which we shall consider later.

Quite different, however, is the situation, when instead of striving for rights, which it is the general interest of society that he should have, an individual proposes changes which are calculated to give him, or his class, or party, greater power to the detriment of the liberty of others; when his own aggrandisement beyond the proper limits of rights is his object; when his motive is not merely to create an equality by raising himself up to the level of others, but rather to develop a reversed inequality by putting himself above that level. Then repression must necessarily follow. One of the greatest practical difficulties in the way of establishing a perfect common liberty has arisen in such cases; when numbers of people, though recognising the inordinate ambition of some leader, have felt that, by adhering to his fortunes and supporting his claims, they could better their own condition, and have hence neglected to take into account members of the community

otherwise affiliated. Indeed, this idea has been followed as a theory of society during the greater part of the world's history.

We next consider the effects of a proposed change, as nearly as we can calculate them. This is often a work of great difficulty; and the inability to foresee what consequences will ensue is a great incentive to conservatism, as no doubt it ought to be. The situation is an especially perplexing one when the immediate results of any action or course of action are likely to be injurious, while the remote effects seem certain to be beneficial. It was probably more conducive to the immediate welfare of the American colonies on the eve of their rupture with Great Britain to submit to unjust taxation than to plunge into a great war. But the benefit to the posterity of the colonists from the success of such a war was incalculably great. The whole progress of civilisation has been attended with convulsions. Humanity's greatest triumphs have been achieved through and after terrible woe to many who never profited by their suffering. They were immolated that others might live. And in the minds of those who contemplate the wreck and ruin, the blood and the agony of a struggle even for a good cause, does there not often arise a deep wonder whether the result accomplished was really worth such a terrible price? And if so, what right have we to sacrifice those who went down to disaster for the benefit of a newer generation? Freedom, indeed, may be glorious, but of what use is any larger liberty to the soldier who perishes to gain it?

These are hard questions to answer satisfactorily. For the present, it is sufficient to observe that, wheresoever our judgment may strike the balance of moral equities, it is incumbent upon us in estimating a proposed change to get clearly before our minds all the facts possible as to the immediate and the remote consequences of such change. It is a most dangerous and reprehensible practice to adopt an ideal of what we conceive to be a better state of things, and pursue it without taking into account the effects of the pursuit. If we see our goal it is not wise to stampede for it. We may never reach it because of the obstructions, and we ought to look to ascertain upon whom we shall trample in the rush. If we will, we can use the largest ideal of human welfare to very great advantage; but only when applied in connection with a discrete process of examining individual circumstances and conditions, as they are, over a wide extent, in space, and a long period of time.

As the interests of proponents of change must be regarded, in like manner the interests of opponents must be studied. Here, as in the other case, the causes of opposition may be selfish or may lie in disinterested sentiments, and respecting them a line of remark applies similar to that of the former paragraphs. Opposition to any innovation, if it be egoistic, may proceed from a clearly defined apprehension of injury, or it may be the outcome of a disinclination to be disturbed with only a confused perception of the results likely to follow. This resistance of inertia favours the let-well-enough-alone policies the world

over, and gives rise to arguments against change which are often extremely plausible. They are, nevertheless, for the most part grounded in selfishness, and the egoism which lurks in them should always be exposed and allowed for.

Not only ought we to look at the effects of a proposed reform, but also we should consider in that connection the consequences of leaving things as they are. No doubt there is often expediency in enduring present ills rather than inconsiderately to fly to ills of which we have not had experience, or which we know not. We may clearly see that for want of reformatory activity, disintegration of the social organism is going on which will end in a catastrophe. In such circumstances unwillingness to act and *a fortiori* resistance to well-directed activity under conservative pleas are immoral and reprehensible. It is the common liberty which is to be conserved, not any particular system, custom, or institution. There are frequently situations when to leave things as they are is ruinous policy. To allow matters to take their course means to permit them to go to destruction. The ability to discriminate between those movements which, though pronounced and positive, are yet restorative or preventive of anarchical conditions and those which are subversive of the social equilibrium, is one of the very first necessities for a safe and sound judgment upon political and social problems. In view of a bad existing situation imperfect measures may be much better than none at all. They may arrest the dangerous tendency. They may furnish a basis for further improvement. Half a loaf is better

than no bread. Often the beginning is half of the whole work.

Finally, the probability of success or failure of a proposed change should be thoroughly canvassed. If the conditions are such that a movement will result in certain failure, its inauguration and defeat may be a decided obstacle in the way of an attempt under better circumstances. This fact, however, should not influence activity so far as to foreclose effort to change the conditions themselves. And inasmuch as no reform can ever be accomplished unless it is brought before the minds of people, the question of immediate success should not be raised to prevent discussion and the education of men's minds upon the subject. It is chiefly when more decided action is contemplated that the danger of failure should be carefully prognosticated and estimated. Trial and failure, as well as trial and error, may, indeed, have an educating effect; but very frequently the same degree of education may be obtained at a much less expense.

In concluding this general survey, therefore; in addition to the principles declared near the beginning of the chapter for determining the questions which our subject suggests, we may lay down the following general precepts, or directions, for conducting those investigations whose results will enable us to decide what our attitudes and conduct ought to be respecting changes in the social order:

1. Ascertain the interests of the proponents and measure the egoism and altruism in their motives.

2. Follow the same course with regard to the opponents.

3. Determine as accurately as possible the proximate and immediate effects of the proposed change.

4. Determine similarly the remote and ultimate consequences.

5. Consider the result of leaving things as they are, and the relation the suggested change bears to the existing degree of common freedom.

6. Calculate the probabilities of success in accomplishing the change and the results of failure.

CHAPTER XII.

THE FORMATION OF OPINIONS.

THE term 'freedom of thought' is a common one, but it is not ordinarily used with a correct appreciation of its meaning. Thought is always free in the sense that it is a product of mental spontaneity which cannot be directly controlled by any one but the thinker. How far and in what sense it can be controlled by him is a question we need not enter into in this treatise. But at all events laws commanding people to think thus and forbidding them to think in some other way are valueless. They cannot be enforced, and it is quite possible to prevent anyone finding out that they have been violated. The mind cannot be chained. There can be no direct restriction upon thinking.

Nevertheless, there can be a very effectual constraint imposed by various indirect means. A man's thoughts are affected by associations, which are determined by feeling and habit (speaking broadly), themselves constituted in large measure by the action and reaction of the individual and his surroundings. Of course, conduct, and indeed simple expression of thought, may be restrained by other wills, and the modification of conduct thus occasioned has its reflective effects upon the intellectual processes. It

causes the formation of habits of association which exclude other associations. Certain channels of thought are cut which are inevitably followed, inasmuch as they mark the lines of least resistance. Thus, especially in early life, it is easy to teach people not only to think for themselves, but also to think as some one else thinks or would like to have them think.

As life advances the education of interest becomes a still greater power. Men recognise that thought ever tends to expression leading to further action, and they often attempt to stifle their own thoughts when the latter seem to be forcing them on to courses of action apparently adverse to their interests. This they will do by knowingly placing themselves in situations where a strong pressure will be brought to bear upon them from without. Others are unconsciously influenced by like motives, until finally, perhaps to their surprise, they discover that their opinions have wholly changed. Fear of untoward consequences from holding certain beliefs will undoubtedly change those beliefs in many cases, and it is not necessary to suppose any hypocrisy. Such a supposition, indeed, would be very unjust. Similarly, the hope of reward or emolument will influence opinion even without the suspicion of such a cause on the part of the convert. On the other hand, with natures of a different kind the pressure of unfortunate circumstances will stimulate thought. Great oppression gives rise to schemes for achieving a liberation. Revolutionary attempts have usually sprung from the lower classes, forced thereto by intolerable conditions. The despotism of authority has

always begotten emancipatory movements in theorising and speculation. It is thus true that interest not only will at times produce conservative thought, but also will promote the most violent radicalism.

Therefore, 'freedom of thought,' if it means anything at all, means such a condition of freedom of expression and action as will admit of thought unconstrained by the fears growing out of personal interest. Such a condition is one of equal rights before the law and of individual liberty. Beyond this, that enslaving of thought which is caused by the temptations of emolument and sordid dispositions of one sort or another is a matter which must be remedied by education both of intellect and will. The same remark is to be made respecting the effects of inherited tendencies, dispositions created by violent prejudices and the dominant power of evil appetites.

The limitations which society can put upon individual radicalism in thought are hence limitations upon expression and action (the discussion of which I reserve for the following chapters), and the moulding, governing influences of education. If a proper education be effected in youth there would be little need of governmental restraint upon adults; but as the former cannot always be secured there is a call for the latter. At best, however, it is imperfect in its operation. Laws are of little avail without a sentiment which will sustain and enforce them. The best form of government in theory is useless, save where the controlling disposition of the community is to uphold it. To see that as many citizens as possible are possessed of such sentiments as will

insure their position on the side of social order, would therefore appear to be of prime importance.

It is not the purpose of this treatise to deal extensively with the vast subject of Education which thus presents itself before us, but I can hardly avoid pointing out some directions in which the course of education must move in order to create in the individual mind the power to produce valuable thought and useful action. First and foremost, it must be made evident and practically insisted upon that the chief end of education is the formation of a self-knowing and self-regulating character with altruistic dispositions. The mere communication of knowledge is not enough. The control of the feelings and volitions is requisite. In order that a man may be of the most use both to himself and to his fellows, he must have developed such a mental constitution as will enable his emotions and his will to respond to a proper intellectual stimulus and refuse to respond to an improper one. Nor is this all. Habits of feeling and volition themselves determine intellectual associations. As a person is in such respects, so does he think. We are very much inclined to underestimate the influence of habits of action other than intellectual upon the intellectual processes, though when we come to consider the matter such an influence is readily seen to be inevitable. Everybody, for instance, recognises the fact that the sybarite is generally a conservative, because of his indolence. His habit of life is opposed to activity. He takes what is within his reach and enjoys the pleasures of rest, but has a horror of anything which disturbs his

peace. For similar reasons old people are very conservative. The same fact is illustrated on the other side in many ways ; very conspicuously in the readiness displayed by professional soldiers to glorify war, and their comparative insensibility to its fearful immorality. Their ideas on this subject are largely controlled by their mode of life.

Hence, one great obstacle in the way of the formation of trustworthy opinions is the inability of the average individual to understand the motive causes of his beliefs. He lacks the capacity to be suspicious of himself. He is not willing to ask, How do I come to entertain this view? Nor has he the patience to answer such a question. He suppresses the inquiry at once, and if another makes it he feels insulted. He will not allow even to himself his own selfishness. A proposition is true because he maintains it. A measure is right because he has come to favour it, though he does not know why and will not examine himself to find out.

Now it is quite impossible to arrive at theoretical truth or to determine the practical value of any proposed change, if our minds are to be swayed by influences whose force we cannot measure, and of which, indeed, we are scarcely conscious. Such a situation exists not only among savages but also in civilised and intellectual persons. It is then of the highest importance to educate people into the habit of self-inquiry that they may have sufficient self-knowledge to estimate the influence of the personal factor in the development of their opinions. Self-knowledge is a necessary preliminary to self-control,

and he who is not master of himself has not reached a degree of manhood which will enable him to realise his own ends, much less to become a useful member of society.

Of course human selfishness is the root of the evil. The statesman well knows that in proposing a measure to be adopted or rejected by popular suffrage, or by the votes of a legislative assembly, he has to base his calculations of its success upon the opinions of the voters as likely to be formed upon their interests, rather than on any broad view of the general welfare. If he gets them even to act according to what they believe to be the interest of their own narrow constituencies, he has accomplished a great deal. The art of practical politics respecting measures has become largely a balancing and trading of interests, in which the advantage of a small class dominates that of the whole community. It is true that diverse interests will often counterbalance and check each other, but the intelligent statesman of high purpose never will give up the hope of inspiring the people with an honest desire to secure the welfare of the whole organism by the adoption of political measures which shall apply to all consistently, rather than to rest content with the crude and unsatisfactory method of offsetting one man's selfish claims by those of another.

Neither self-knowledge nor self-control can be attained without thorough discipline in early life. For this both the training of the family and that of the school are necessary. In a free country the idea is apt to prevail that a child should be suffered to

grow up with as little interference as possible; that his inclinations should be favoured, all his desires gratified, and his self-assertion overlooked. No doctrine could be more dangerous and no practice more damaging. The habit of denying self, preferring others and working for others, should be acquired in the first twelve years of life in order to insure the formation of such a character as will make the grown-up man and woman act according to those maxims whose universality as law they can at the same time voluntarily decree. Charity begins at home and in childhood. In the absence of a discipline of self-repression, maturity will show a character in which the satisfaction of self is the chief end. If it is not brutally selfish, it is likely to be of the rule-or-ruin order. It will lack that self-distrust which we have just been commending as necessary even for self-knowledge. With such a person there is little toleration of the opinions of others. Those plans are good which he advocates, but measures lose all their excellence when he cannot have the credit of proposing or leadership in promoting them. The world must revolve around him and a feudal relationship established between him as lord and the rest of the community as feudaries. Such a type of man is certainly of limited vision, and of still more limited usefulness to his fellows.

Systems of state education have many enemies, coming too from very different quarters. It is a curious spectacle to behold Herbert Spencer and the Roman Catholic priesthood joining hands in a crusade against public schools. To me, the maintenance of

such schools seems of the utmost importance on the very ground upon which all government action is primarily justified, namely, that of security. Why security requires that they be upheld has been made sufficiently apparent in the foregoing pages; a full consideration of the matter is hardly within the scope of this treatise. But allowing that a system of public instruction is justified, it ought to be made efficient, and accorded a place among the governmental departments commensurate with its importance. This can never be while the salaries of those in charge of educational institutions are so ridiculously insufficient. Surely the head of a large school in a city performs a service to the community as valuable as that of a clerk of court, or of a municipal department, or even a police magistrate. But comparisons of the schedules of compensation will reveal, I venture to say, that the positions of the latter are generally more advantageous. The effect of inadequate compensation to practical educators is twofold. It prevents the community from securing and retaining the best talent in the profession, unless there is a universal equality of low salaries. Moreover, it discourages persons of the highest abilities from attempting to find a satisfactory career in educational work. Its importance is belittled to the great detriment of the public interest. It promises neither wealth, honour, nor fame. I cannot but think that the failure to properly recognise the high value of schools, colleges and universities; to provide amply for their maintenance and extension as a matter of public policy; to remunerate teachers and superintendents, and honour them as other public

servants, is a reproach to any civilisation that claims to base itself upon the principles of common liberty and security.

It is not alone the egoism of personal interest nor the desire for personal supremacy that stands in the way of the formation of correct opinions respecting change and conservation. Minds are terribly warped by sympathies and antipathies of many sorts. Likes and dislikes of individuals, family ties, party affiliations, religious sentiments, æsthetic susceptibilities—all control action to so prevailing a degree as to override the considerations which reason declares ought to prevail. The world seems to like enthusiasms of all kinds. The man whose feelings are strong and who manifests them in his action commands attention and elicits admiration. Even if his cause be deemed a bad one, he is praised for his zeal. He sways other men's minds and is extolled even by his enemies. It is generally considered that without the zealot's ardour, which concentrates itself upon the object sought and cannot be diverted, no reform can be accomplished. Every movement for better things must have some Peter the Hermit to lead it, or it will fail. Till human feelings are powerfully affected, it is said, no thorough nor valuable work can be done.

A character controlled by its emotional states might be well enough, if we were sure that the emotions were aroused on proper occasion and their force rightly expended. But the power of emotion is usually attained only at the sacrifice of powers of discernment and discretion. Intellectual strength comes through a process of checking and repressing

emotions. He who is at the mercy of waves or gusts of feeling cannot look comprehensively. His passion possesses him; and self-direction and self-control are made difficult. In such a state he does not learn anything; he simply puts forth impinging or resisting force. Sometimes force thus developed accomplishes surprising results. If the results are good, it is a matter for congratulation; but we have no guaranty that at the next ebullition the consequences will not be pernicious.

Upon the whole, it seems to be very evident that strongly emotional characters ought to be discouraged, that as intelligence increases in the world they will be more rare, and that this circumstance is one to be rejoiced over rather than lamented. No doubt, in such case, the heroic virtues seem to be abated; but the business of the state will be done better, the social organism will be healthier, and the world will be the gainer thereby.

The inevitable effect of a concentration of sympathies is to narrow the circle of their application. Intensity is gained and extensiveness is lost. Without doubt altruism must begin somewhere. If I am to love my neighbours generally I must commence by loving some one of them. That, however, is no reason why my regard should stop with him; nor is my conduct less laudable if I distribute my good offices among many. In loving one we do not thereby love all; we limit our usefulness and perform an incomplete service for humanity.

It is often said that the deep feelings which the family relationship inspires are the most noble of

which human nature is susceptible. But it is also said in the same connection that family affection is the true type of the feeling we ought to cherish toward all mankind. Yet no one would expect that a European who loves his son would entertain the same regard for the Hottentot whom he has seen for the first or hundredth time. The truth is that altruism, the humane, the Christian character, is measured not by intensity of emotion, but by conduct. Abou ben Adhem is revealed by deeds not by phrensy.

Therefore, if emotion supplies raw material, intelligence must work it up; if feeling gives the dynamite, the intellect must fashion, point and fire the gun. If there be concentration it should be under intellectual supervision; for 'the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the commandment over the will; for it is a commandment over the reason, belief, and understanding of man, which is the highest part of the mind and giveth law to the will itself; for there is no power on earth, which setteth up a throne, or chair of state, in the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions and beliefs, but knowledge and learning.'¹

Beautiful as is the mutual love shown in a well-ordered family, it often seems to be the cause of a very marked distortion of intellectual vision. Every married couple's child, for example, is the best in the neighbourhood. No other ever had or is likely to have such perfections; and this is loudly announced in the style of the hen, which cackles when she has laid an egg. Nor is it a matter of mere playfulness. The

¹ Bacon: *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning*.

claims made are believed in ; and while to others they appear ridiculous, their assertion is deemed a merit. So in more important things the virtues of kindred are frequently exaggerated, they are pressed forward in their careers, their interests are furthered, without much reference to their capabilities or to considerations of natural justice.

I do not mention these things because they are of so much consequence in themselves, but because they are symptomatic of a disposition inimical to the formation of correct opinions and the development of a well-balanced mind. It may be observed with justice that instances of bitter hatred in families, and oppositions arising out of family jealousies, are as numerous as those of a contrary nature. This very fact, however, supplies another argument against the permission of emotional domination. For, if sympathies are strong, antipathies will also be strong. The sympathetic nature is the one capable of the most intense malevolence. He who is most madly in love is the most uncontrollably jealous. 'Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned.' It is the warm friend that becomes the savage enemy. The one who devotes himself most fervently to his party has less charity for his opponents. The most zealous is the most intemperate and implacable. Yet people of such characters are admired for their virtues, while those of judicial and moderate temperaments are decried. The strong partisan is applauded, the 'Mugwump' is hated.

The influence of these sympathetic and antipathetic sentiments is exceedingly subtle and far-

reaching. It avails to create that despotism of authority which we have found to be so pernicious. It is hard to see any good in a person we for any reason dislike; but to one with whom we are pleased we are ever ready to lend a listening ear. It is generally the case that popular endorsement of opinions depends not upon the opinions themselves, but upon the person who utters them. Every one knows how difficult it is for a man unknown or disliked to get a hearing. No attention is paid to what he says. In politics the advocates of a measure always seek for some one of influence and popularity to present it, quite irrespective of its intrinsic merits. In literature it usually takes long years of patient labour before an author's productions will be looked at. The brilliant tyro will find his meritorious poem consigned to the editor's waste-basket, while every line of a Tennyson in his dotage is eagerly printed and read. This is certainly a lamentable state of things. Progress has been hindered by it to an incalculable degree. Because of it, reforms have had to slumber for years and centuries; and there can be no manner of doubt that the world has been immensely the loser by reason of the blighting, crushing power of established personal authority upon that exuberance of mental vitality which makes youth the most active period of life. Not that crudity in political measures, in literature or the arts, should be encouraged; but that what is produced should be judged upon its merits, not by our ideas and feelings respecting the producer. It is conceivable that a convict might write a good treatise on moral philosophy; but who

would read it except from curiosity? Nevertheless the world ought to recognise truth, whoever brings it forward. We often hear it remarked that this one or that, by reason of youth, inexperience, bad character, low rank, is not entitled to be heard. What matters it who the messenger is? The message is what concerns us. The truth at the bottom of the well, the gem in the mire, the good that is in Nazareth, are things not to be neglected because of their circumstances. The lesson of the life of Jesus ought to teach us this, if nothing else does.

The overwhelming weight of personal authority in all the various fields of its operation is sustained largely by the prevalence of a sentiment, which is generally considered highly creditable to human nature. I refer to Loyalty. Poets, orators, teachers of every sort have extolled this trait of character in the most extravagant terms. Its opposite is esteemed base, contemptible, and worthy of all reprobation. But on analysing the sentiment in question we discover that the essence of it is devotion to a person regarded as sovereign, who is the source and the judge of law, whose commands are binding because they are the king's word. The merit is in following the person, not in approving the command as just. It is just because the lord decrees it. Thus the king can do no wrong, and the highest proof of loyalty is a continuance of adoration and service under conduct which would naturally arouse disapproval or rebellion. Under the control of such a feeling brave and noble men have gone unflinchingly to their death, happy in their agony, if only they have had an

approving glance from their master. And, sadder to relate, inspired by like enthusiasm, fanatical hero-worshippers have led their luckless fellow-men to torture, to the stake, the block, the gallows, persuaded that they were but doing justice and punishing for heinous crime.

In precisely the same way sentiments are organised in favour of associations, which are then personified. The political or religious party, the fraternity, the guild, are made objects of fetichistic worship. The defects of the organisation, its errors, its wrong-doings are blinked, while its excellences are magnified, and all glory and honour are ascribed to it. He who brings as an offering the blindest zeal, who is loudest in praise without stint or discrimination, is the most worthy; while the man who doubts, who is lukewarm, or who ventures to oppose within the society, is viewed with suspicion or branded as a traitor.

The same thing is often seen in national affairs. 'Our country right or wrong,' is still the motto which receives most favour. It matters not if acts of aggression are to be committed, if international law is to be violated, or the commands of the higher law of universal charity are to be set aside. Patriotism laughs at such things. Multitudes rally, the pulpit, the press, the rostrum shout the battle-cry; the best blood of the nation goes forth; homes contribute their choicest manhood; acclamations sound and resound. Over what? Perhaps that ruin and devastation, death and destruction fall upon other homes, another people, whose cause is after all the just one.



To him for whom the world is his country these things are inexpressibly sad. They bring bitterness to the soul. Must it always be thus? Will not the broader vision ever come? Will not the mirage fade and the real city of perfect humanity ever appear? It will not, so long as such delusions as I have been commenting upon are allowed to infect men's minds. So long as false theories of morality, disguised forms of absolutism, fetiches in politics, religion, philosophy, literature, art, are permitted to form sentiments and dominate conduct, so long must we anticipate a repetition of such deplorable events. Yet it must not be forgotten that a vast improvement has been already effected since history began, and that all the signs point to a more rapid, and still more wonderful, march of progress. The main thing for us is not to mistake the significance of the conditions and the various movements of our own day and generation, lest we unwittingly hinder where we would help and obstruct where we would advance the beneficial course of social evolution.

In view of the foregoing considerations, no one need lament the decadence of the sacredness of authority, of loyalty as a primary virtue, or even of unrestrained and intemperate patriotism. That there is a very marked diminution of the force of such sentiments in many directions, no one can doubt. Reverence for institutions and for persons in some quarters seems to be extinct. This, to be sure, has its disadvantages, but on the whole the effect is highly salutary. So long as rights of person and property are not held in light esteem, a refusal to

erect any one man on a pedestal above his fellows, and a disposition to bring him down if he puts himself there, are in furtherance of the common freedom and the general welfare.

One of the most striking evidences of the change that is going on in the direction of the equalisation of power, is the decline of oratory, which the superficial observer and critic so often laments, but which in reality is a matter for congratulation. The strength of oratory lies in the appeal to the feelings. It may or may not be necessary to convince by argument; if it is, making the worse appear the better reason is no mean part of the art. But the real power of the orator lies in his ability to move the wills of men through their emotions, thereby dispensing with reasoning. Now it is only the less highly developed mind which can thus be played upon. In the Indian war-dance we have the primitive type of the oratorical art. The mind is swayed this way or that by touching this or that spring of feeling. An ecstasy, a fervour, a fine phrensy is aroused which issues in action in the desired direction. To be sure, the Greeks, attaining an eminent degree of cultivation, were susceptible to oratory, and carried it to its highest perfection. But with them the æsthetic was developed at the expense of the moral. They admired the beautiful for itself without regard to utilities. They enjoyed the titillation of the sensibilities, which beautiful phrases, fine figures, and elegant address produced. Moreover, they were not scientific, and cared little for facts. If they were not, as was charged upon the Cretans, all 'slow-

bellies'; they were most of them liars. The truth was not in them, and they hated it. A true proposition stood no chance in their minds beside a lie contained in a well-turned period. They were not a well-balanced people. They were æsthetic savages, who mobbed their best men and glorified their bullies and rascals.

The growing indifference to public affairs displayed by many of the most intelligent and prosperous people, in the United States at least, though certainly an evil, may justifiably give rise to some optimistic reflections. For the chief cause of this neglect is the influence of the notion that governing has ceased to be a good business. Instead of furnishing an opportunity for a glorious career of personal aggrandisement, governmental administration has become constabulary work. It is much better to hire men to manage public affairs than to take the time and undergo the trouble oneself. For me, the man of wealth and culture reasons, there is neither pleasure nor profit in it. If there be an emergency, I can go to the front: but in all likelihood I shall not need to disturb myself. What if affairs are sometimes mismanaged? The damage is less than if I were to give up my business or my pleasure to take active part in public affairs.

Now, that such an attitude is very reprehensible and dangerous to the public safety, we do not need to argue. But it never would be adopted, save under conditions which are themselves healthful. It indicates the possession of a true theory of statecraft, namely, that the government is an agency and not

the expression of a sovereignty; that the public officer is an employé with no vested rights in his office; that he is, if you please, a hired servant; and that the private station is, selfishly considered, the better. Then, if maladministration occurs and things go wrong, let us not commit the error of wishing for a return of the old notions of sovereignty and fealty, of the inherent sacredness of authority and office, of reverence and worship as oblations to superiors. Let us work rather in the direction of arousing an interest to require that our public servants do their work well, that the rules of private business govern their selection and the performance of their duty. Let us strive to make it appear that every one is injuriously affected by inefficiency and malfeasance, and endeavour to impress upon those who do enter the public service the truest idea and responsibility, which belongs to the highest and most important agencies.

To sum up the lesson which it is the object of this chapter to convey—self-knowledge and self-control in individuals are prime necessities for the creation and sustenance of such opinions as will furnish reliable guides to that conduct which the social ideal requires. The habit of being suspicious of the correctness of one's positions and of the justice of one's sympathies and antipathies ought to be systematically cultivated. To this end there ought to be effected an abatement of the power of emotions over conduct and character. If the time ever comes when everybody's opinions are perfectly right and just, we need not

trouble ourselves much about their feelings : but until that happy day arrives we should not forget that powerful sentiments of sympathy and antipathy are very often serious obstacles in the way of making human beings see and do the truth.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE EXPRESSION OF OPINIONS.

IN order to find out whether one's opinions are correct or not, it is well to express them. Other people's estimates can then be obtained, comparisons instituted, errors detected, deficiencies supplied. But with the most of mankind the purpose of such expression is not so much to get more light, to revise and correct, as it is to enforce their views. They like to lay down the law and have their auditors accept it. The result of letting others know what we think hence results in discussion essentially polemical, with anxiety on both sides to maintain one's own thesis and to put to rout the antagonist. This is not always profitable, but it induces mutual respect, makes persons aware of their limitations, and develops very frequently some disposition to reconsider, if only to discover more potent and deadly arguments for the next encounter. At any rate intellectual activity is stimulated ; and that is a great gain. The effect on all concerned would seem to be salutary.

Nevertheless, it has always been a hard matter to secure liberty of expression, or even toleration. It is easy to see why tyrants and absolutists should not want opinions adverse to them to be expressed, because, of course, such expression more or less endangers their domination. It is perfectly logical

for the Czar of All the Russias to establish a censorship over the press and over oral utterances. On his theory of government, he would be very foolish not to exercise it. But there are some people who do not pretend to be supporters of autocracy, who, nevertheless, believe in some such censorship on grounds of general utility. To such, a word is to be said. I do not propose, however, to waste time or space in arguing that liberty of speech would be desirable for the Czar's government. It would be just as reasonable to claim that the burglar should allow the awakened sleeper to shout and arouse the neighbourhood. The burglar's only course is to knock the man on the head, or smother him. So of the autocrat, who occupies to society the position of an armed robber. He maintains himself only by force, and it would be exceedingly silly for him to let the hue-and-cry be raised against him. No doubt there are reasons of policy which will at times commend themselves to a despot, for allowing expressions of opinion on a political matter, especially when he is pretty well assured what the opinion will be. But that is not liberty; and nothing fit to be characterised as such has ever been recognised or permitted to exist institutionally by any absolute monarch, or by any ruler of absolutist tendencies, if he could help it.

In the United States and in Great Britain freedom of expression is, with some few exceptions, guaranteed by law, and public sentiment favours it on the whole, though by no means uniformly and consistently. Yet it is often permitted even to the extent of personal abuse of an outrageous character. For this, indeed, there is

a remedy in a suit for damages or even in a criminal proceeding, though comparatively speaking these are not availed of with frequency. The writer once heard the Prince of Wales reviled in the streets of London by an elderly man who yelled forth the most obnoxious epithets almost beside the carriage conveying the Prince to the Guildhall. Police were near by and heard the utterances, but the person was not molested. I think if the same thing had occurred in New York, and the object of spleen had been the President, the Governor, or the Mayor, the offender would surely have gone to prison. Still it is better to err on the side of free speech than against it. Everything considered, the law in the United States on this subject is in the main satisfactory. A prominent exception is the blasphemy statutes remaining in some states ; but these are substantially obsolete—relics of ignorance whose vitality is gone. Another exception is what are termed the Comstock laws, against obscene literature. While no objection can be offered to reasonable preventive measures against the exhibition and sale of indecent publications, the provisions of these laws are so stringent and fanatical as to be in derogation of social and individual liberty. Again, there has been a disposition recently manifested to restrain the utterance of language inciting to riot by decreeing criminal penalties. The provocation for such legislation has been sometimes very great, but it may well be doubted if it be wise. It is dangerous business to attempt to muzzle people. In Great Britain similar measures have gone beyond all the bounds of propriety, save on the robber-baron theory.

The student of the course of social progress and the seeker for the best methods of promoting it must consider the subject of the expression of opinions in its broadest aspect and its widest relations. Such a consideration cannot fail (so far as I am able to judge) to disclose the paramount importance to the state of both permitting and sanctifying the utmost freedom of expression. It is not enough that such liberty be legalised ; it must be approved by the general sentiment of the community to the extent that he who makes unpopular utterances may do so without fear of any untoward consequences to himself by reason of unjust prejudices and antipathies.

Of the many defences of liberty of expression two stand forth conspicuously for their excellence. One is Samuel Bailey's essay 'On the Publication of Opinions' ; the other, Mill's 'Liberty.' For an admirably clear presentation of the advantages to the state of free speech and the disadvantages of any interference by law with its expression, both of these treatises are worthy of high commendation. Mill's work is generally read ; but the other, I fear, is not, though it ought to be by every one who needs to be educated on this subject. It will be a great pity if either is suffered to fall into neglect. In consequence of the existence of these essays I shall make this chapter considerably shorter than I should otherwise, hoping that the reader who is not familiar with them will have the interest to study the treatises mentioned. But there are some observations which I shall venture to make as especially pertinent to the present times

and to circumstances where liberty of expression is supposably secured by law.

It cannot too often be brought to our attention that laws to be efficacious must have a supporting sentiment in the minds of the people, and that it is a part of the business of good citizens to look out for the cultivation of such a sentiment. There is a special application of this truth to the topic now before us. It often occurs that a man may express unpopular opinions and be quite safe from the jail, while he is so thoroughly condemned by public or private feeling as to be avoided like a leper. He is supposed to be morally guilty and is deemed unfit for good society. This does not fulfil the ideal of social liberty as related to the expression of opinion.

Such a thing usually happens with respect to opinions which are reprobated by some established authority, or when excitement runs high at some political crisis. An attack upon orthodox religious beliefs illustrates the first, while the second is exemplified in the case of the man who attempts to stem the tide sweeping a nation on to a war which patriotic feeling favours. In either case sentiment, not calm reason, rules. There is no thought of the propriety of balancing arguments. There is no moral condition of mind. The spirit of the tiger, or of the human murderer, prevails; and there is no place for either truth or justice.

The case in favour of liberty of expression is briefly this. By shutting people's mouths we cannot prevent their thoughts. Restriction will generally make them more obstinate in their opinions and more

active in covertly promulgating them. If it does not have this effect, it will quench their mental enthusiasm and make them of less value to the community. If the opinion which is reprobated is erroneous, there is no more sure way of preventing its injurious effects than to give it a thorough ventilation. The more publicity the better. Declared in secret it will infect other men's minds and work harm; proclaimed openly, its proper counteractions will be discovered and brought to bear. If, on the other hand, the opinion is true, it ought to be expressed; and opposition to it, if its truth be known, can only come from knavishness. If its truth is uncertain, the way to resolve the uncertainty is to have it communicated and discussed. On all accounts, public policy demands that the expression of opinions be free.

Is there to be, then, no restraint whatever imposed on what people shall say? Must there be no social inhibitions? Must we tolerate the 'crank' and accord him honour? Must we listen to ideas which outrage all our best feelings? Are indecency, treason, and irreligion to be allowed full freedom for their blatant utterances?

These questions cannot be answered categorically. In the first place, the law of libel and slander is perfectly reasonable and proper. No man shall use his liberty of expression to injure another in reputation or in property. The common freedom requires this, as much as it demands that one person shall not beat another, or steal his purse, whether thereby he steals trash or valuables. Again, decency is a matter of common liberty; and the protection of the young is

always a subject for state solicitude. Public indecency of speech, then, furnishes a legitimate cause of regulation; though, as before remarked, there is great danger of undue fanaticism upon this point. But here are two classes of cases in which there can be little doubt that governmental restraint is justifiable.

Those who believe in equal rights and who recognise in the government, not a sovereignty but an agency of the community, will find no warrant for prohibiting any criticism of political measures or administration. In this lies the security of free states. Remedies for personal libels ought still to exist, but suggestions of all sorts, wise or foolish, sane or rabid, should be allowed full vent. Better let the mob orator alone, till he has committed some overt act, or until the danger is very imminent; then let him talk on with an abundance of police standing by to keep the peace. The chances are greatly that the pent-up wrath will be dissipated in the expenditure of breath. But the moment that order is broken or immediately threatened, it is time for interference; and that interference should be prompt and decisive.

John Morley's warning in his work on 'Compromise,' that we ought to preserve always the right of expressing disapprobation as well as approbation, comes to mind very pertinently in connection with the question how much force should be allowed to social sentiments respecting opinions and their holders. If a person expresses ideas which are ridiculous, it is human nature to laugh at them. No one likes to see an ass mounted on a platform,

crowned with laurel and receiving the adulation of the multitude. Nor does the principle of freedom of expression require this. But even the idiot has the right to enjoy his own idiocy. It is not necessary to trample on him nor to ignore his lucid intervals. He may be able to work ; he ought not to be denied a living. He may be useful to his family, and they should not be made to suffer for his shortcomings. It takes all sorts of people to make a world, and universal charity is the law of moral conduct.

The trouble is not so much, in the cases of intellectual imbeciles, on account of their imbecility as because of an incorrigible self-assertion which often accompanies it. The more dense their ignorance, the more intolerant they are themselves apt to be. They insist upon being heard in season and out of season, and upon obtruding their own personality everywhere. Such people must be snubbed. Everyone has a right to his own companions for speaking and hearing. He is not obliged to submit to having his intelligence insulted, nor to undergo the physical pain of inane speech roared about his ears. Social ethics do not impose such a hard rule ; it is quite enough if he refrain from assaulting the offender.

The evil of social intolerance does not principally spring from contempt of crude notions put forward by the obviously feeble-minded, or from impatience at that class of individuals known as 'cranks.' It arises from too uncompromising antagonism against those of opposite views who are able enough to be feared. John Stuart Mill remarks very justly that offence to those whose opinion is attacked is usually

‘given whenever the attack is telling and powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent.’¹ Such a state of mind is frequently exhibited by clergymen, when either their doctrines or their methods are criticised. Like a great man’s lackey, though their master be humble and candid, they appear to think it necessary to be themselves arrogant and censorious. Still more pronounced is this same spirit in political life. It is shameful beyond expression that men, in other things sensible, display such utter absence of candour, such absolute disregard of truth, such bitter animosities, such a narrow view of conditions, such a callous insensibility to the interests of the country they profess to serve, as appears every day in the words and actions of ‘statesmen’ in more than one country of the civilised world. Their business is to weigh matters; in fact, they simply follow their party. They take an oath to serve their country; they sacrifice the latter to defeat their opponents and to secure the triumph of their own organisation. More than this, they abuse and vilify their adversaries unsparingly. What those in high places do, their adherents in humbler station revel in licentiously. Were it not that their extreme course defeated their own ends and destroyed the force of their utterances, the consequences might be very disastrous. As it is, they are damaging enough. The average political campaign is a series of disgraces to the community

¹ *On Liberty*, ch. ii.

which has to go through with its exhibitions of sordid, untruthful, and malevolent human nature. It makes one ashamed of his kind, and causes him to wonder if there are ten just men in Sodom.

The true way to promote that charity which issues in just deference to those who differ from us is to multiply the occasions of social communication. From one course and another personal contact tends to develop respect. The presence of another personality softens the asperities of our thought and tempers our expression—from fear, if from no better motive. We find the other man not so bad as we had imagined, and if he is conciliatory or not aggressive, we are inclined to be magnanimous. Resistance even inspires respect, and while we are of our own opinion still, as regards the matter at issue, we seek for points of common sympathy and agreement. The increasing complexity of human life in society helps this. Our political opponent is very likely our friend in business. We may need his help any day in trade or commercial enterprise. We must be cautious how we vilify him. Our religious outlaw may be a Chrysostom, and we may desire his eloquence upon the rostrum to aid our party's cause in the coming canvass; or in the court room before the jury upon whose decision depend our greatest interests. The clergyman who in the pulpit is to us the cannibal savage in all but costume, may yet in social life have relations which are of benefit to ourselves or our families. Business, politics, social fraternisation—all tend to an increase of mutual toleration, charity, respect. This is the explanation of that famous

couplet of Pope about the effect of familiarity with vice; it might be applied with equal truth to any dislike or prejudice, though qualified by the contempt-producing effects of too close and too constant intimacy.

These natural bonds should be increased in number and in strength in every possible way. Hence, everything which is likely to set up impassable barriers between people should be discouraged. Here occurs one of the great evils of caste and rank. They cut off intercourse. The prohibition of social hospitality operates strongly against what Robert G. Ingersoll so aptly styles 'intellectual hospitality.' It shuts the door abruptly and keeps it closed. It will not allow the stranger any opportunity to show that he is worthy to become a guest. It judges him unheard and unseen. It refuses to recognise him as a human being. He is placed in the same category with the wild beast; the domestic animal being treated far better. With this state of feeling denial of rights is inevitable and persecution is easy.

The extreme effects of this caste sentiment are illustrated in the East; but they are apparent enough in Western civilisations. It is exemplified in that singular caddishness which runs all through British society, pervading even the world of letters. What a lamentable state of morals and manners is witnessed when Mr. Gladstone becomes ostracised from Tory households, to which he was formerly a welcome guest, and when party lines determine generally social hospitalities! How petty seems the whole system of precedence regulating social intercourse! How

contemptible the distinctions between 'gentlemen' and 'tradespeople,' between the titled and the untitled, between the established church and dissenting churches! The harm of these things is somewhat nullified in England by the interfusion of commercial interests and the complex character of her industrial civilisation, increasing the dependence of those in higher stations upon those in lower, and also by the degree or freedom of expression which prevails there; but harm is done, and in the directions I have indicated.

The habit of building walls and making enclosures to which the British mind is so incorrigibly addicted is quite conspicuous in literature. The old sneer about American books expressed a fact. Nobody did read an American book. Times have changed, indeed, but when a prominent critic, who made it his business to observe and instruct, commented upon the taste of Americans in reading 'a native author called Roe,' in the same style that he would have commented on the habits of the Fijians and with like implications, one cannot help feeling a grave solicitude about the mental condition of the educated classes in Great Britain. When 'a native author' succeeds so far as to sell eight hundred thousand copies of his works in a country filled with the best of antecedent English literature very generally read, even the child-brain would be able to comprehend that there must be a high degree of comparative excellence in that author. The whole criticism of which the above comment is a sample is a very good illustration of the conditions to which an educated mind may be reduced by the caste prejudice. It fosters the most hopeless kind of ignorance—the self-

satisfied and the arrogant. It makes people whose powers of observation are atrophied believe that they are keen-sighted ; whose judgment is superficial, felicitate themselves upon their profundity ; who are wholly unable to investigate comprehensively and compare accurately, feel assured of their infallibility. Of course we must pity such persons ; we will allow, however, that they, if not those whom they criticise, are highly ' interesting ' ; but rather to the pathologist, the psychologist and the social philosopher ; for from their cases more valuable lessons can perhaps be drawn than from the study of the normal, healthy mind.

The utility of comparisons of opposed views before social audiences cannot be doubted. Gatherings for this purpose have met with much favour in America, and the plan of publishing together different opinions on various topics of interest has been adopted by some of the reviews, with very noticeable success. The Commonwealth Club of New York City consists of men of every political complexion, who dine once a month and then discuss political conditions as well as measures needed for the welfare of the state ; a definite topic being fixed by the Executive Committee, and speakers assigned with a view to the presentation of conflicting opinions. These discussions have not only elicited a great deal of valuable information respecting the existing methods of conducting public affairs, but also have resulted in the formulation of plans for improving the machinery of government which have been substantially adopted by the legislature, the governor's veto alone preventing final success.

The Club has made its influence felt very decidedly in the community.

In similar manner, but with a wider range of activity, the Nineteenth Century Club of New York City, founded in 1883 by the late Courtlandt Palmer, has achieved a national, if not international reputation. In this organisation the two sexes are about equally represented, and by liberty of expression has been made fashionable. It is worth while to quote the 'Objects and Aims' of this association. 'The motto of the Nineteenth Century Club is "Prove all things ; hold fast that which is good." It will not commit its individual members, nor as a society will it stand committed to any special theories or measures in politics, industry, science, art, philosophy or religion ; but on its own platform of universal liberty of expression it will, in the discretion of its management, invite prominent thinkers and workers in all the fields of human research and activity generally to present their views to its audiences. On this platform of mental liberty any person of either sex, radical or conservative, orthodox or heterodox, whose ability and character will warrant, may be invited to speak before this Club, in the hope and belief that by interchange and comparison of conflicting opinions a basis of agreement on important questions may sometime be evolved.'

This constitutional declaration has been observed with entire faithfulness, and brilliant audiences have gathered to listen to some of the most prominent thinkers and workers of the country, with a number of representatives of English thought also. The discussions have been reported and widely published,

often calling forth a great deal of journalistic comment.

With a platform of this description prefaced by a motto from the New Testament Scriptures, one would think that such a society would receive universal approbation. Least of all ought the clergy to object to it. But, singularly enough, some of the latter have uniformly condemned it apparently for living up to its principles. A minister of one of the prominent metropolitan churches expressed from his pulpit the regret that there existed in the city 'an intellectual cock-pit' where Christians, Jews and Infidels meet on the same sand to peck each other's eyes out. He thought Christians did not exhibit much shrewdness in patronising the pit. The wonder is, why not? If what they believe is true, how can it suffer by comparison with untruth? Why should any opportunities for enlightening the world be lost? And if all truth has not been discovered, why not seek for more? Besides, such a meeting is not at all for the purpose of scratching people's eyes out. It is rather for scratching them in again, when already out, as the wondrous wise man of our town did by jumping into the second bramble bush. It was intimated in a former paragraph that opposition to free expression of opinion in a public way must proceed either from knavishness or foolishness. As regards the doctor of divinity in question, no doubt he is well-meaning, nor would any one be prepared to say that he is underwitted. But when a man opposes free and fair discussion, we must account for his conduct somehow. The most charitable supposition is that he is ignorant.

Even if he be an educated clergyman claiming to be a public teacher, this may be forgiven him. But his salary ought to be reduced, if it be certain that he does not repent for making remarks exhibiting such a gross deficiency of 'lucidity.'

After all said, there is nothing to be compared with the press as a civilising agent. The late Matthew Arnold manifests considerable superficiality of observation with respect to American life in his criticism of newspapers. American journalism needs improvement, no doubt, and some of his suggestions were good as far as they went, but the critic failed to see that minute details in regard to persons and things, reported and published, have a far greater influence upon conduct than statutes can have. The transgressor against the social law hates publicity; and the knowledge that his deeds and his character will be exposed to all the community exercises a powerfully restraining effect. Even if much of the news published is only fit for the 'servants' hall,' it is well that it should be read there. The newspaper is not for any one class or condition. Its office is to present a record of current life. In so doing it becomes also a censor of morals and manners. Oftentimes it invades the region of purely personal matters too inconsiderately, but the evils thence arising are not worthy of mention beside of the good which is done by the eager investigation for news which is pursued so fearlessly and so thoroughly by the American journalist. Under such a supervision fraud and corruption cannot long subsist, meanness cannot thrive, erroneous theories lose their influence,

mistakes of fact are corrected, estimates of character lose their extravagance, and the public forms a much more just idea of the world they live in and of the people who inhabit it. The press is a great leveller and equaliser, preventing on the one hand undue exaltation and on the other undue disparagement.

While this is true of journalism as a whole, to so full an extent as to justify us in regarding the American variety as one of our most valuable institutions and greatly superior to anything of the sort to be found in other countries, those superficial defects of which Mr. Arnold complained ought to be corrected. The sensational manner of expression, the triviality of facts mentioned, the indecency, the disproportionate attention given to vice and crime which are observable in many of our newspapers deserve condemnation, and can very readily be modified without destroying the essential usefulness of the journal as a purveyor of information and as a guardian of the interests of society. But the great difficulty with American newspapers, as at present conducted, is, I apprehend, their carelessness of truth and accuracy. Their anxiety is not to get at all the facts and exhibit them in their true light, but rather to seek those items which are of a startling or sensational character and to present only sensational phases of the matter in question. Accuracy is a secondary consideration. Mistakes are rarely corrected or even admitted. The newspaper office is not by any means a 'truth-shop,' as Mr. Franklin Ford (an American editor) declares it always ought to be. The only way for the general reader to satisfy himself as to the

correctness of statements is to read several papers and then he is by no means assured. Of course, too, outrageous injustice is often done by indifference to accuracy; and this of itself is reason enough for greater care and a more sensitive conscience. A journalistic friend of the writer once told him that the public did not want the 'truth-shop,' and that it would not pay. I believe him to be mistaken. Truth does pay, and is a necessity in trades journals, of which there are multitudes; and if the same ideas were carried into all classes of news matter, I feel sure the public would appreciate the change from present methods. Competition between journals will probably bring about the desired reforms. Each will be seeking to improve upon the others, public taste will be educated, and prospective loss of circulation and influence will stimulate editors and publishers to realise a higher journalistic ideal.

The great abundance and cheapness of books, newspapers, periodical literature of all sorts, naturally diminish greatly the importance of the pulpit, the rostrum, the platform, as educational agents. People go to hear a speaker fully as much to see the man as to listen to the words which they may read at their leisure in the morning paper. If he says anything of much value, they know it will be published. Hence, too, the requirement comes that speakers shall amuse or entertain. If they can also instruct, all the better; but they must not be dull. The serious, reasoned discourse of former times thus ceases to be popular. What is to be said must be bright and interesting. This is quite as true of educated,

cultivated people as of the *vulgus*. The writer once addressed by invitation an association of ministers upon the 'Social Problem.' He thought it would be a poor compliment to them if his address did not contain some reasoned thought; and of this he made up the body of his discourse, prefaced, however, by something in lighter vein. Much to his surprise, he saw afterward in a report of the meeting made to a religious journal, that the first part of the paper was excellent, but that he soon grew very tiresome, and ought to have remembered that he was addressing men in Monday morning mood, tired out with Sunday's preaching! The writer was reminded of the concert which the Zulu chiefs were given in London, at which, after the usual preliminary scraping of violins, good substantial music was rendered. At the close the Zulus were asked what piece they liked best, and with one accord they said that the first music, meaning thereby the tuning of the instruments, was by all odds the finest! He was glad to note, though, that the correspondent drew the lesson from his example that preachers should remember on Sunday that business men worn out by their week's labour were in the pews before them, and they should endeavour to enliven as well as instruct.

Thus the most potent instrumentalities for the expression of opinion have become the written rather than the spoken word. The former is and ought to be much more effective as it certainly is more valuable. Socratic methods of button-holing ought to go out of fashion. Opinions do not so often change by oral arguments. People read for themselves and think as

they read. Knowledge thus gained is worth vastly more than any which is enforced by the personal presence of a public speaker. It is no sign of deterioration of intellect that people demand to be amused and will not listen to the learned prig mounted on a platform. Rather it is evidence of a greater intelligence. Let the prig print his paper but not inflict it on us, unless it is interesting. These remarks, however, should not lead to the belief that all oral address should be abolished. On the contrary, discussion is of much importance, as we have previously urged. They should merely teach us how such discourse should be carried on. If the change wrought by journalism and literature generally is understood, he who addresses an audience may by skill and care so develop his subject and so phrase his thought as to really instruct and benefit as well as delight the men and women who are gathered to hear him.

I will conclude this chapter with an admonition both to conservatives and radicals. The former should understand that there can be no compromise as to the right to express opinions without penal consequences and without personal opprobrium seriously affecting the relations of him who utters them to his fellows in the community. The only limitations upon this right are those of libellous, slanderous and indecent matter. They should also remember that an opinion is not to be condemned for its novelty but judged upon its merits; that the way to fight injurious opinions is to discuss and not suppress them; that inquiry, doubt and proof are wholly legitimate

even respecting long-established ideas ; for conditions are all the time changing and newer and better methods of discovering and testing truth are continually appearing.

It behoves the radical to be wary in his expressions, for he has to contend with the established. The other party is in possession. The fact must be recognised that sentiments once fixed are hard to change, and, unreasonable though it may be, antipathies of all sorts have to be encountered by him who wishes to introduce novelties. Hence opinions in favour of change ought to be carefully elaborated, fortified with abundance of facts and with strong reasons, objections anticipated and met, prejudices overcome by patience and good temper, and their promulgation everywhere governed by considerations of prudence with regard to probable results. The feelings of people have to be taken account of, and he who shocks and horrifies, thereby closes the mind of the offended one against all persuasion. This is peculiarly true with regard to religious subjects, which involve very strong feelings. It is also pertinent to questions of the domestic relations. There must be earnestness, seriousness, deference to the sentiments of others, or the only impression created is a hostile one.

Sometimes, no doubt, ancient prejudices are so obstinate, minds are so callous, or arrogant self-assertion is so overweening, that all the weapons of wit, ridicule, sarcasm or denunciation may be necessary to break up the crust of conservatism which has destroyed intellectual vitality. The ground must be

ploughed and fallowed before the seed can be sown. But such methods are dangerous and ought to be employed sparingly. He who jests often is seldom taken seriously. The man who ridicules is apt to be deemed venomous. He who denounces too vigorously is always regarded as intemperate, and little heed is paid to what he says beyond the moment of utterance. Apparent inconsiderateness argues want of thoroughness. The thought of the radical is esteemed to be anarchic, and the reaction against it is strong. People are afraid of being hurled into some abyss, if their leader seems inclined recklessly to leave the travelled road. After all, the substantial, the permanent victory is achieved in the realm of thought, not by the fierce attack and hand to hand combat, but by disintegrating the forces of the enemy through destroying their combativeness, by thus opening their ranks not by closing them. The effort, then, should be to dissipate resistance, not to excite it by the clangour of arms; to reduce passion, not to arouse it by displaying our own; to show forth candour on our part and respect for those from whom we differ. The great task is to reduce the controlling power of emotions. In the words of Samuel Bailey, 'the most favourable moral condition in which the inquirer can be is, unquestionably, when he is possessed with a simple and fervent desire to arrive at the truth without any predilection in behalf of any opinion whatever, and without any other disturbing emotion of hope or fear, affection or dislike.' There is also good counsel in what Locke says: 'To be indifferent which of two opinions is true is the right temper of mind that pre-

serves it from being imposed upon, and disposes it to examine with that indifferency till it has done its best to find the truth, and this is the only direct and safe way to it. But to be indifferent whether we embrace falsehood or truth is the great road to error.'

Radical partisanship is as bad as conservative in its essence, and is worse as a matter of policy. Conflict of ideas no doubt there must be, but we must always aim to change the situation from one of attack to one of quiet comparison and suggestion. Then truth will do its own work as surely as the sun causes the inhospitable snows to disappear and the barren waste to become clothed on with verdure and blossom with fair flowers. In these days of intellectual achievement and consequent pride, we need to be again reminded that after all we have as yet picked up only a few pebbles on the shore of the ocean of knowledge, and that the danger is still, not that wisdom will die with us, but that we shall die without it. But if we preserve that indifference to the result of our inquiries which Bailey thought to be 'the most favourable moral condition' for arriving at truth, we must be equally careful to keep alive that eager determination to find the truth, the real truth, and be satisfied with nothing less than the truth, which Locke held to be so essential to prevent one from pursuing the highway to error. At such times as the present, when a pointed epigram is more persuasive than a carefully stated proposition, when all the great problems of knowledge are settled off-hand, in opposite ways, in single paragraphs of different journals, a little less positiveness of statement, a little more respect for the

matured opinions of others differing from us, will be very advantageous—not, indeed, for the sake of preventing a frank and full expression of differences, but rather to create the disposition frequently to doubt and revise our own conclusions. To this end, therefore, it seems to me we have great need of insisting upon a more thorough study of questions of supreme human interest. And if there be that sensitiveness to the importance of embracing truth rather than falsehood, on which Locke laid such stress, I think there must follow a greater seriousness in the method of approaching such transcendent themes. No Berkeley in the realm of philosophical or religious thought was ever vanquished ‘with a grin.’ Man may or may not have descended from the ape, but caricature of the theory will not help us to determine the fact. Jesus Christ may or may not have risen from the dead, but ridicule of the belief has no doubt often prevented an investigation of the evidences; and this is of the first importance, whatever may be the conclusion to which we may ultimately be led. If the gods be all dead, Time and Space and Cause are not dead. There is still Immensity and the solemn presence of a limitless Supernatural which conditions our natural lives and without which thought itself is impossible. It forces itself upon our intellect and subdues our feelings. It impresses itself upon us in the rolling of the sea, in the light of the myriad worlds which shine upon us nightly, in the birth of life, and in its mysterious cessation. We never can escape its influence though forms of expressing our beliefs and hopes change. Unknown it may be; in a sense unknowable; but it

stimulates us unfailingly in the quest of knowledge. We are sure that there is more for the human mind to know, and ardour fills us to still seek for Happy Isles and achieve 'some work of noble note,' 'to strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.'

In such a pursuit of truth and the happiness it brings, the methods of science must be adopted and unflinchingly pursued. Those methods demand careful observation of facts, faithful experiment, doubt, and verification. Above all things 'Let us be honest'; but also let us be cautious even if we are obliged to make haste slowly. When we enter new territory, let us be prepared to retain and annex it. Let us see the end from the beginning, behold our destination, discover the road which will reach it, control our steed and keep him within the path. Science no doubt has its hobbies, but in order to reach its goal it cannot afford, as Mr. Gladstone has well put it, 'to ride an unbroken horse and to throw the reins upon its neck.' And, too, if possible, let our light shine forth to illuminate, not merely to make the darkness visible. The plodder in the fields of science knows well that however beautiful are the showers of stars which fall from skyrockets and however useful they may be for signals, they never can furnish him the quantity or quality of light necessary to guide him on his perplexing way. Rather is it requisite to pursue the method of that one who wrestled so long and faithfully with nature for her hidden truths respecting the origin of species and the descent of man, at every step doubting his own conclusions, with a mind never swayed by passion but always open for new evidence,

inspired by that single love of truth which extinguishes intellectual pride and makes dogmatism impossible. In religion he was agnostic and did not accept the cardinal doctrines of Christian theology. He was by many regarded as a dangerous enemy of Christianity; but if so he conquered his foes and is still conquering them, not by slaying them, but by converting them and taking away their hostility. In this example I cannot but think there is a sublime lesson for all seekers and preachers of truth. For it was the recognition and appreciation of Charles Darwin's serious mind, his careful progress in his work, for ever revising and verifying his results, oblivious of self and caring for naught save truth, that brought around his bier opponents and friends, clergymen and laymen, Christians and Agnostics alike, who, moved with one accord of homage, went beneath the vaulted arches of England's great memorial Cathedral, 'to lay there his honoured and sacred head.'

CHAPTER XIV.

RADICALISM AND CONSERVATISM IN ACTION.

EXPRESSION of opinion is certainly action and has pronounced effects upon human society. But action as contrasted with opinion means effort put forth for some specific end, to accomplish some definite practical result in the way of changing existing relations of people to each other or in resisting such change. Thus a distinction is drawn between words and deeds, the latter being considered of greater consequence, as the ultimate expression of thought.

The main difference between the rules which ought to govern expression and those which should control action arises from the fact of the more serious effects of the latter. More properly, however, the differences lie in the application of the same rules. We have to consider more carefully the results upon the happiness of individuals which will follow a proposed course. All the precepts given at the conclusion of Chapter XI. must be observed and practically applied. Because of the interests involved and in proportion to the effect upon them, conservatism is much more necessary than where nothing more is to occur than the utterance of words.

The general principles of this whole subject were given in the former chapter. Besides, in the two chap-

ters last preceding it was unavoidable that much should be said pertinent to the special topic of this head. The main questions left for us to consider seem to be the mutual relations and limitations of Principle and Practice, involving the utility and propriety of compromise, the dependence to be placed upon counsels of expediency, and the bearings of probabilities of success or failure.

There are plenty of people to whom a single course is always right and no other can be. To them the slightest deviation is error; the least concession, a base surrender; any thought of expedencies, high treason to principle. This uncompromising spirit sometimes places the supporters of principle in ludicrous situations, as when we see prohibitionists and the advocates of free rum united in opposing high license, or the American Board for Foreign Missions refusing to send out men for their service, who are filled with the missionary spirit, but think they can convert the heathen quicker if they are not too positive about the damnation of the latter's ancestors. People live who prefer no bread unless they can have the whole loaf, who are perpetually for cutting off the nose to spite the face. About all that can be said is, as was remarked by counsel to the jury in the nuisance case, when an old lady was brought forward by the other side to testify that the smell of poudrette was delicious to her and beneficial to her health—‘There *are* such people.’

‘Principle’ is of no avail except with reference to conditions and circumstances. It is not usually contended that what is suitable for heaven is suitable for

hell, but the argument from so-called principle would justify such a contention. Adaptation of means to ends is the first dictum of reform. Means must take account of circumstances ; if not, they become useless, or worse. Fanaticism, untempered by prudence, never pays, and it is remarkable that it should ever seem admirable. One would suppose that when men talk loudly about 'loyalty to principle,' they should be loyal. Loyalty consists, it would seem, in promoting the success of the principle, getting people to recognise it, causing its adoption and realising it most completely in practice. How, then, can it evince any such loyalty to adopt a course certain to fail and to bring disrepute upon the movement, making it so much harder to inaugurate and carry out a subsequent movement? People who act in this way need to be apologised for. The only possible excuse is that they know no better ; but it probably would be beneficial for the adherents of the cause unfortunate enough to have their support, to tie them together and send them over to the camp of the enemy.

Nevertheless, there are cases where action may be justified, though likely to fail. Some of the world's heroes have seen their opportunity to lie in this way. Not all martyrs have been fools, though it must be urged that a greater number of them were than is usually allowed. Now and then the very boldness of a hopeless attempt startles the community, awakens admiration, arouses pity, sets people to thinking, and puts in motion forces which favour, and perhaps finally work out the triumph of the defeated cause. But the social value of such

attempts depends very largely upon the conditions in the state where they occur, with reference to the expression of opinions. If speech is free, agitation, through written and oral communication, will accomplish more than any violent or revolutionary movement. Not much success can be attained until the times are ripe for it ; and it is far better to wait for the slow growth of public opinion than to hazard or sacrifice property and life, or disturb the peace of the community.

But in countries under military domination, where liberty of the press is unknown, and where it is a crime even to express desire for a change of government and to pass the slightest criticism upon the acts of the sovereign, what is to be done ? Nothing but war is of any avail, and to make war effective there must be combination, which is conspiracy. Hence follow destruction and death to some, at least. Under such circumstances, however, revolutionary movements which promise no success may sometimes be expedient for the reasons just given. They are certainly heroic, and if inspired by a moral purpose those who participate in them are surely worthy of great honour ; but even then in most cases a better result would be secured if men preached boldly their doctrines and suffered for the preaching instead of proceeding to violence, which will perhaps involve many persons in ruin with little to compensate for the sacrifice.

If there be a fair chance for success in a contemplated revolution, another aspect is put upon the matter. But to justify the organisation and use of

force, there ought to be not only a deprivation of fundamental rights, but also an evident impossibility of effecting the needed changes by peaceful means. Considered abstractly there exists the moral right to a change of government when that social liberty which we have defined in Part I. does not exist; when men are not secure in their liberty, and when equality is denied. The restriction upon radicalism in that direction comes from practical considerations of expediency. The cost must be counted; and if by delay, by the shapings of events, tendencies toward a better state of things can be created which will in time work out salutary results, it is far better to be a conservative.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a person claiming a sovereignty which allows him to act without law, to have the power of life and death over subjects, to enter into wars of his own will, to hold men and women in confinement indefinitely without a trial, against whose acts no word is to be uttered, is ethically himself no longer entitled to the protection of law. He is a wild beast whom it is entirely legitimate to hunt and kill whenever there is opportunity. He is an enemy of society. If the hunter himself fall into the clutches of the beast and is destroyed it is a matter for great regret; but there is no ground for disapprobation of his personal conduct, except on the score of imprudence. There are, however, in the case of the human tyrant, other consequences besides those befalling the man who goes forth to slay him. Shooting a king or two does not alter the form of government. Though the particular tyrant be gone

another reigns in his stead. If the hunter's efforts are not crowned with success the despotism is made still more terrible, and the heavy hand of the autocrat is laid upon all who are suspected of revolutionary or even liberal ideas.

These last two considerations seem decisive against the policy of assassination. The anonymous dynamiteur will never reform the society in which he operates, not because the Czar whom he attacks is not fully entitled to be blown up, but because his method is essentially valueless. His act and attempt is only a protest against the existing *régime* which is emphasised by the sacrifice of one or more human lives. It cannot be denied that such sacrifices do have influence, but an influence not worth the sacrifice and its reactive effects.

Any one who has read the remarkable series of papers on Russia, by George Kennan, published in the 'Century Magazine,' cannot fail to be appalled at the political and social conditions of that country. No wonder that the most desperate schemes are concocted against the government, because men are driven to such despair as to act like madmen. Not only is equality scouted and liberty of political action closely limited, but numbers of people are held for years in confinement, unable to get a trial, allowed no opportunity to show their innocence, and often in ignorance of the charges against them! In view of such a situation we who live in England and America may perhaps better appreciate the inestimable value of the great writ of *habeas corpus*. The censorship of the press is rigid and the importation of books is carefully

supervised, obnoxious portions of particular works being cut out by government agents; police *espionnage* is everywhere practised to an almost intolerable degree. But without going into details, with which everyone is familiar—How can relief be obtained in such a country? What are the remedies for such an atrocious state of things?

The process of amelioration very probably will be a slow one. This reason teaches, and yet great changes have often occurred through catastrophes, and are likely so to occur spite of all counsels in favour of moderation. This fact, however, does not dispense with the duty to avoid, if possible, such destructive convulsions. In Russia it is not at all likely that the autocracy can be perpetuated in the face of the march of civilisation. Intelligence is rapidly increasing, even under the Czars. Mr. Kennan found in libraries in Siberia the works of Mill, Buckle, Herbert Spencer, Darwin, Draper, and many other advanced thinkers; mutilated by the censor, indeed, but still containing enough to be readable. Personal contact among themselves, the universities, the advent of foreigners, the introduction of improvements of all sorts, must have a highly beneficial effect in diminishing the inequality of conditions. By-and-by the government of Czardom will find its strength gone and the substantial change will be followed by one in form. Meantime, dynamite plots ought not to receive encouragement. They are wrong because they are of little utility; the gain is inferior to the loss. A revolution is in order when it can be organised and attempted with good chances of success; but till then

the oppressed should be content with whatever milder means they can employ for social improvement, and await the progress of events. As for the governing classes, they would do well to ponder the line of considerations set forth in the first part of this treatise, and learn that their method of government is a crime against social nature, which will sooner or later receive severe punishment. Too much publicity cannot be given to the infamous provisions of the Russian penal code quoted by Mr. Kennan,¹ which, it is needless to say, are enforced relentlessly, even upon suspicion and under which proof of innocence is often of no avail. 'They not only include all attempts to overthrow the government *vi et armis*; they not only cover all action "calculated to create disrespect for Majesty"; but they provide for the punishment of the mere intention to bring about a change of administration at a remote time in the future by means of peaceable discussion and the education of the people. Even this is not all. A man may be perfectly loyal; he may never have given expression to a single thought calculated to create disrespect for the Gossudar (Czar) or the Gossudar's government, and yet if he comes accidentally to know that his sister, or his brother, or his friend belongs to a society which contemplates a "change in the existing form of government," and if he does not go voluntarily to the chief of gendarmes and betray that brother, sister, or friend, the law is adequate to send him to Siberia for life.'

It may be said that we never can tell how far the beneficial results of our efforts for improvement may

¹ *Century Magazine*, Dec. 1887.

extend even if they are unsuccessful ; that it is our duty to work and leave the question of success to Providence. To this it may be answered that neither can we tell how far our attempt may be harmful, unless we calculate closely the results. Of what use is intelligence unless for just such purposes ? Real good, not apparent good, is what we should seek. The only substantial objection to discouraging radicalism which is aggressive at all hazard and irrespective of likelihood of immediate success, lies in the possibility that waiting for the progress of events will induce supineness, will tend to prevent expression of radical opinion, paralyse effort, and create positive obstructions to reform. Of this there is indeed great danger, especially where one's material and personal interests will be promoted by keeping still. This is always a serious difficulty in the way of improving a present status, as we have already in this work strenuously urged. But such consequences are by no means inevitable, especially if freedom of expression be maintained. Thus it again becomes apparent that the latter is of the utmost importance in a community. It is quite feasible to create an attitude of mind exhibiting a willingness to cherish ideals of a better order which if realised would necessitate very radical changes, to preserve also a desire for such realisation, and yet be anxious to be prudent in adopting practical measures looking toward the desired end. It is eminently wise to establish such mental habits. But the proper balance cannot be preserved unless men recognise that it is the right and duty of every one to express his opinions, however radical, with the utmost freedom

and fearlessness. John Morley, in his work 'On Compromise,' which might well be ranked with Mill's and Bailey's treatises mentioned as classics in the last chapter, makes the following remarks which are very apropos in this connection : ' Now compromise . . . may be of two kinds. Of these two kinds one is legitimate and the other not. It may stand for two distinct attitudes of mind, one of them obstructive and the other not. It may mean the deliberate suppression or mutilation of an idea in order to make it congruous with the traditional idea or the current prejudice on the given subject, whatever they may be. Or else it may mean a rational acquiescence in the fact that the bulk of your contemporaries are not yet prepared either to embrace the new idea, or to change their ways of living in conformity to it. In the one case the compromiser rejects the highest truth, or dissembles his own acceptance of it. In the other, he holds it courageously for his ensign and device, but neither forces nor expects the whole world straightway to follow. The first prolongs the empire of prejudice and retards the arrival of improvement. The second does his best to abbreviate the one and to hasten and make definite the other, yet he does not insist on hurrying on changes which to be effective would require the active support of numbers of persons not yet ripe for them. It is a legitimate compromise to say, " I do not expect you to execute this improvement, or surrender that prejudice in my time. But at any rate it shall not be my fault if the improvement remains unknown or rejected. There shall be one man at least who has surrendered the prejudice and who does not hide the

fact." It is illegitimate compromise to say—"I cannot persuade you to accept my truth; therefore I will pretend to accept your falsehood."'¹

The distinguished author just quoted from appears, however, to undervalue the pursuit and attainment of intermediate ends. It may, indeed, sometimes be the case that small reforms are the enemies of great reforms, if reform stops with the lesser achievement; but there is a more powerful, educating effect in the accomplishment of reformatory change than Mr. Morley seems to consider. If the minor reform is effected and is not adequate, the advantage of the greater improvement will become more manifest and the want of it more keenly felt. A little freedom always makes man eager for more; a little knowledge is dangerous because it stimulates to the attainment of a greater. It quickens the activities in all directions. When, therefore, having ourselves the idea of a radical change for the better, for which we cannot expect the support of less advanced contemporaries, we work for less conspicuous and less radical changes leading in the direction of the ultimate reform, we are no doubt acting wisely. This, probably, Mr. Morley would allow; but his argument, especially at the close of his book, appears to inculcate that it is better to wait until we can realise our ideas fully, 'than to defraud the future by truncating them, if truncate them we must, in order to secure a partial triumph for them in the immediate present.' If this means that we should never lose sight of the higher end, or modify our ideas of what is really and ultimately best, we

¹ Chap. v.

may agree to the sentiment ; but if the author intends that, if we cannot secure all we would desire, it is better to wait and not accept what we can get as a partial satisfaction, it seems to be vicious doctrine.

It must not be forgotten that one of the chief inducements to an obstinate conservatism is the intemperance of radicals. Conservatives are afraid of even the least concessions, the latter seeming to be but giving place to the entering wedge. The tendency of movements is from one extreme to another. The French Revolution is always thought of. If people could be persuaded that a change once begun could be controlled, they would not be so sensitive about its initiation. But they are apprehensive of a destructive avalanche. In this apprehension they are often justified. Such being the case, it is incumbent upon radicals to be themselves cautious and conservative. It is of much more importance to change the sentiments of people than to carry a point by sheer force, since, as before said, without such an alteration of sentiment the victory is of little practical effect. Hence the value of labouring for minor ends which can be gained without too great a disturbance of the existing status, and without arousing all that conservative opposition which springs, not so much from objection to a proposed measure in itself, as from the dread that its adoption will lead to a general breaking of flood-gates in whose maintenance rests the safety of the community.

This inclination to rush from one extreme to its opposite, can only be cured in the ways suggested in the former chapters, namely, by the further develop-

ment among men of a well-balanced intelligence superior to passion and prejudice. Such an intelligence ought to make itself felt effectively in one special direction wherein lies a great deal of difficulty **in the way of effecting reforms.** It ought to act as a solvent of **political parties** and factions. Social progress necessarily involves a **considerable amount of political action.** A party for, and one against a particular measure, set of measures or course of action is useful, if for no other purpose, at least for insuring a full discussion : but unfortunately parties have a tendency to perpetuate themselves for the sake of the party itself. The result is not merely that men come to care more for the party than for the purposes for which it is supposed to exist (upon which result I have elsewhere commented¹), but they are carried along contrary often to their best judgment, to favour or oppose what the leaders and their following decree on the theory that they owe fealty to the party, and it is their duty to obey the constituted authorities. Hence questions of the utility of special projects of reform become subordinated to questions of whether this or that party shall have the ascendancy. A man may believe in a measure advocated by the opposite party, but dread the triumph of that party on any issue whatever. If there are to be changes he wishes his own organisation to make them. With a similar feeling on the other side, it is obvious that the accomplishment of beneficial changes is rendered extremely difficult. They first must be adopted in the party counsels in which all

¹ See chaps. viii. and xii. ; also *The Problem of Evil*, chap. xxiii.

the considerations of probable effect upon party success are likely to have the most weight; then if they are finally promulgated as party measures, they must encounter all that prejudice and distrust of which we have just been speaking. The old notion of loyalty to party as a primary political virtue should be displaced, if possible. Government by party is a crude and clumsy method of managing the affairs of a state. Unquestionably those who agree will associate and organise. But the main thing to accomplish is the effective organisation for or against certain measures or candidates, and then the dissolution of that organisation after its work is done. To this end, there must be intelligence and the spirit of independence. Furthermore, means should be devised for giving greater opportunity for individual independence to express itself, so that it may have a better chance to do its legitimate work in breaking up that party solidity which is such an obstacle in the way of reform. This can best be accomplished by taking away as far as possible the patronage which follows party success, and by complete state control of the machinery of elections, guaranteeing to the individual the expression of his opinion by his ballot without hindrance or assistance from party machinery. If private emolument or advancement in power and reputation were less certain to follow as a reward of party fidelity, that independence of action which is so necessary for the welfare of the community would more frequently display itself. It is to be hoped that the time will come when men are radical because they have well-considered radical

ideas of their own, not because they belong to a radical party; and when conservatives are such of their inward convictions, not because they wear the uniform of an organisation called conservative.

Upon the whole it must be concluded that radicals and conservatives are, for the reasons stated, about equally to blame for the wholesale destruction which sometimes accompanies or follows the inauguration of political change—the former because they are too intemperate, the latter because they are too obstinate and unyielding. Thus avoidance of extremes on both sides is to be inculcated: then a proper equilibrium may be preserved between the static and dynamic forces which we have found to be necessary for social progress.

There is a form of radicalism in action which calls for some more particular observations, because plausible justification for it is frequently offered, though it is exceedingly dangerous. I refer to the failure to execute laws through the feeling that they are unjust or perhaps obsolete. The responsibility of allowing statutes to fall into desuetude is sometimes taken by officials who are apparently supported by public opinion. This is very common in such matters as excise or minor police regulations, open violation of law being often unrebuked. Similarly, the blasphemy laws are substantially a dead letter in most places. But reflection must show every one the unwisdom of allowing law regularly enacted to be nullified. It is far better to rigorously enforce a bad law and then speedily get rid of it. The thought that a public officer may according to his own notions vary the

decrees of the law-making power, is exceedingly pernicious and demoralising. It weakens the structure and tends towards anarchy. Especially is it important in a democratic community where the power of changing laws rests with the people, that when once laws are made they should be strictly enforced. The stability of the community rests upon this. It is very unfortunate, therefore, that a disposition to palliate offences manifests itself among intelligent and orderly people, to shield offenders from prosecution, to consider by way of excuse other things than questions of fact as to whether the latter have or have not violated law, to the end of preventing conviction and punishment or of securing pardon after sentence. Sentimental pleas can be urged in favour of any criminal, but people ought to see that it is absolutely essential for the good order of the state, for the security of its citizens, that there be no uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. Therefore, it is imperative that those officers charged with the execution of law shall execute it until repealed, whether it be good or bad, whether supported by public opinion or not ; and that the person who is accused of violation shall be tried, convicted and punished, although our opinion may be against the statute under whose operation he is made to suffer.

The sum and substance of the matter as to the mutual limitations of radicalism and conservatism in action is that radicalism should never be allowed to become blindly destructive nor conservatism blindly obstructive. The most far-seeing intelligence and the most charitable feelings toward one's

fellow-men should govern all conduct. Radicalism is especially in danger of crudeness and empiricism; conservatism of obtuseness and want of 'intellectual hospitality.' Greater conservatism is requisite in action than in mere expression, because the consequences of the former are generally more momentous. Free expression should be encouraged in every way; while action should be carefully guarded and strictly regulated by considerations of the highest expediency and utility. The subject of this chapter has been by no means exhausted, but enough has been said to illustrate the principles which have been set forth as necessary to be observed in any thorough and honest effort to promote Social Progress.

Social Progress is only made in the direction of obtaining the most perfect liberty. The most complete individual happiness is the ultimate desideratum; but this can in no way be secured but through the perfection of Social Liberty. The latter is even necessary for the perfection of individual freedom. To realise such ideals of liberty there must be law, because only through law can there be security. Nor can security be perfect except there be equality of rights. These, in turn, cannot be maintained if there be great inequality of power. And, in fine, none of these conditions can be completely developed save through the universal prevalence in humanity of that disposition and character by which one finds his happiness and welfare in the happiness and welfare of his fellow-men. Thus we shall be obliged to modify Locke's declaration in the preface to his trans-

lation into English of the first 'Letter concerning Toleration,' wherein he says: 'Absolute Liberty, just and true Liberty, equal and impartial Liberty, is the thing that we stand in need of.' Absolute Liberty is precisely what we do not want; but rather the highest degree of *relative* Liberty—of each individual as related to all others. But omitting the first clause, in the sense and meaning defined in the foregoing pages of this work, we may agree that still—


'Just and true Liberty, equal and impartial Liberty, is the thing we stand in need of.'

In considering the methods to be followed for securing this liberty, let us not lose sight of our goal; but remember that as we draw nearer to perfect social conditions positive law will grow less necessary. If all men had the true altruistic disposition there would be no need of government. The course of progress is from the anarchy of the primitive state through law and government to the anarchy of the perfect state. We should aim, then, to diminish the restraints of authority, and, though working cautiously and tentatively, should seek ever to contract the sphere and minimise the duties of government. Only thus can that City arise into which the glory and honour of all the nations may be brought.

I can find no reason for discouragement, but, on the contrary, every reason for hopefulness as to the future of social life, though its perplexing problems are by no means all solved. If the following words concluding the essay 'On the Publication of Opinions' could have been pertinent when uttered by the 'Bentham of Hallamshire' in 1821, how much more evi-

dent is their truth to day ; and how wise appears for our times as well the counsel with which they conclude !

‘Whoever has attentively meditated on the progress of the human race cannot fail to discern, that there is now a spirit of inquiry amongst men which nothing can stop, or even materially control. Reproach and obloquy, threats and persecution, will be vain. They may embitter opposition and engender violence, but they cannot abate the keenness of research. There is a silent march of thought, which no power can arrest, and which it is not difficult to foresee will be marked by important events. Mankind was never before in the situation in which they now stand. The press has been operating upon them for several centuries with an influence scarcely perceptible at its commencement, but daily becoming more palpable and acquiring accelerated force. It is rousing the intellect of nations, and happy will it be for them if there be no rash interference with the natural progress of knowledge ; and if by a judicious and gradual adaptation of their institutions to the inevitable changes of opinion, they are saved from those convulsions which the pride, prejudices and obstinacy of a few may occasion to the whole.’



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